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On the first day of his first administration, 
President Franklin Roosevelt announced: 
In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this 
nation to the policy of the Good Neighbor -- the neigh-
bor who resolutely respects h~self and, because he does 
so, respects the rights of others -- the neighbor who 
respects his obligations and respects the sanctifY of 
his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. 
Although Roosevelt's verbal touch was needed to give 
this foreign policy a name, definite changes in the Latin 
American policy of the United States had already appeared 
during the preceding Hoover administration. Indeed, Calvin 
Ooolidge was probably defining his own peculiar version of 
the Good Neighbor policy when he asserted at the Sixth Inter-
national Conference of the American states at Havana, in 1928, 
that "it is better for the people to make their own mistakes 
2 
than to have someone else make their mistakes for them." 
Coolidge's ideas on the Good Neighbor were more 
honored in the breach than in the fulfillment. His military 
intervention in Nicaragua in 1926 could not be reconciled 
with the concepts of national sovereignty and independence 
lFranklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, 
Washington, D. e., March 4, 1933 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1933). 
2~uoted in Ricardo J. Alfaro, Commentary on Fan 
american Problems (Cambridge: Harvard university-Press, 
1938), p. 31. 
2 
held by Central and South American States. The Havana 
Conference, itself, was marked by bitter debate, the United 
States taking an extremely strong stand against the prin-
ciple of non-intervention. It is clear that the true basis 
of Coolidge's policies lay in his declaration that 
The person and property of a citizen are a part 
of the general domain of the nation. Even when 
abroad •••• there is a distinct and binding obli-
gation on the part of self-respecting governments to 
afford protection to the persons and property of their 
citizens, wherever they may be. l 
This was in the best interventionist tradition, 
closely following the interpretation given the Monroe Doctrine 
by Theodore Roosevelt and his successors. 
Although taking an active interest in the Latin 
American revolutionary movement and among the first to 
recognize the independence of the new republics in the 
first two decades of the nineteenth century, the United 
States failed almost entirely to participate in the first 
Sixty years of inter-American cooperation. 2 First attempts 
at collaboration were most inauspicious. This country was 
lCalvin Coolidge, "Address to the United Fress," 
April 25, 1927 (~~ Times, ~ril 26, 1927). 
2Brief outlines of the origins of Fan Americanism 
may be found in many places. One of the best is in 
Howard Trueblood, "Progress of Fan American Cooperation," 
Foreign Folicy Reports, XY (May 15, 1940). In the Bulletin 
ot the Pan American Union, LXXIV (~ril, 1940), there is an 
aol;-[iscusslon ot the early conferences in which the United 
States did not take part. 
3 
invited to send delegates to the first Congress of Eanama 
in 1826, called by Simon Bolivar, President of ieru; the 
Senate debated at great length before accepting the in-
vitation, and, when delegates were finally appointed, one 
1 
missed the boat and the other died en route. Indeed, ex-
cept for Fresident Monroe's famous message of December 2, 
1823, the United States displayed little political interest 
in the nations south of the Rio Grande until well after the 
Ci vil VJar. }!'rom 1826 to 1889, this country was not r epre-
sented at any of the numerous political conferences of the 
Pan American States. 
When the United States finally sought Latin american 
cooperation, economic motives lay behind the country's stated 
desire to foster peace in the Western Hemisphere. It was 
this pecuniary motivation that "led to the Pan American move-
ment •••• conceived by James G. Blaine (Secretary of State) 
as a diplomatic trade mark for the expansion of the commerce 
2 
of the United states." This was in 1881, but, due to poli-
tical dissension within the United States, the First Inter-
national Conference of American states did not meet until 
1889. 
lCf. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History £t ~ 
.American Feople (New York: Crofts, 1940), p. 195. 
2Samuel Flagg Bemis, ! Diplomatic liistor~ £! ~ 
United States (New York: Holt, i936), p. 736. 
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The thirty-nine years from 1889 to 1928 marked the 
period of active imperialism by the United States in Latin 
America. ~rimary motivating factors behind this country's 
belligerency in the southern nations -- in the Caribbean 
area, specifically -- were economic aggrandizement and a 
determination to eliminate any threat to the self-interest 
or to the security of the United States. On one hand, 
this aggressiveness was expressed in direct efforts to 
foster business and f1.nancial interests; on the other hand, 
the policy involved intervention to restore order in revo-
lution-ridden or debt-swamped nations, and to prevent 
European interference in Latin American affairs. It is one 
of the ironies of history that the Monroe Doctrine, pro-
mulgated to prevent European intervention in the New World, 
became an instrument sanctioning such intervention by its 
promulgator during this period. 
Nothing better illustrates perversion of the Doctrine 
than statements of this country's diplomatic leaders: 
Secretary of state Richard Olney, on the British-
Venezuelan boundary controversy of 1895: "Today the United 
states is practically sovereign on this continent, and its 
fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its inter-
1 
position." 
lQuoted from Foreign Relations, 1895, Olney to Bayard, 
July 20, 1895, in Bailey, ~. cIt., p. 483. 
And Theodore Roosevelt, in his message to the 
Congress of December, 1904: 
Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results 
in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society 
may in America, as elsewhere, ult~ately require inter-
vention by some civilized nation, and, in the Western 
Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the 
Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however 
reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or 
impotefce, to the exercise of an international police 
power. 
Events that marked this imperialistic phase of the 
Caribbean policy included the direct challenge to Great 
Britain during the Venezuelan controversy of 1895; assump-
tion of a virtual protectorate over Cuba in March, 1901; 
taking Panama from Colombia in 1903; extension of near-
protectorate status to Nicaragua after overthrowing the 
dictator, Zelaya, in 1914; bombardment of Vera Cruz in 1914; 
the punitive expedition against Fancho Villa in 1916; mili-
tary occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1915-
1916; dispatch of a battleship to Panama in 1921; sending 
of marines and sailors to Nicaragua in 1926. 
During this period of four decades, six verbose but 
2 
largely meaningless inter-American conferences were held. 
IJames D. Richardson, Messages ~ Fapers of ~ 
Presidents (Viashington: Bureau of National Li ters.ture and 
Art, 1905), X, 831, quoted in Trueblood, ££. ~., p. 292. 
2rn the Special Handbook !££ ~ of the Delegates, 
for the Seventh International Conference (BaltImore: ¥an 
American Union, 1933), pp. 1-21, there is a brief but com-
plete history of the proceedings and results of the first 
six conferences. 
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The fact that acute Latin American distrust of the United 
States was never absent indicates the actual unimportance 
of these meetings. Nor could the southern nations be cen-
sured for their attitude. From time to time, however, there 
Were some small rifts in the olouds of justifiable suspicion. 
Thus the United States gave Latin America profound satisfac-
tion in 1914, when it accepted the mediation of the ABC Fowers 
in its dispute with Mexico. This act, together with the Con-
ference summoned in 1915 by Pre sident Wilson to discuss the 
Mexican situation, aroused high hopes in Latin AIlllerica of a 
1 
new era in Fan American relations. 
But, with the close of the World "'ar, there was, if 
anything, a promounced growth of "Yankophobia" on the part 
of Latin American nations. With the United States' occupa-
tion of Santo Domingo, financial intervention in Haiti, and 
the dispatch of marines to Nicaragua, ill will was almost at 
a new high before the Sixth Conference of American States at 
Havana in 1928. ~or did the able defense of American inter-
vention presented by Charles Evans Hughes do more than gloss 
over matters at this meeting. The net effects of the Con-
ference were as much for the bad as for the good. The fact 
that a prominent Argentine delegate lett the meeting after a 
verbal tiff with Hughes constituted an unpleasant aftermath. 
lOf. "Fan ~ericanism and the Fan American Conferences" 
(Foreign PoliQy ~sociation, Information Service, Nov. 27, 192~) 
p. 280. 
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Definite change in Latin American policy appeared 
under the Hoover administration. Growing criticism at home 
and abroad and the difficulty of maintaining property rights 
during economic depression undoubtedly contributed to this 
change. The general shift in policy had been foreshadowed 
to some extent by the publication in 1930 of a memorandum 
on the Monroe Doctrine written by J. Reuben Clark, Under-
1 
secretary of State. Although never officially endorsed 
by the administration, this work attracted Wide attention 
because of its strict construction of the terms of the Mon-
roe Doctrine, repudiating the Roosevelt corollaries as 
unjustified by the words of the original statement. That 
the Clark memorandum was an index to future action soon 
became apparent. 
The usual military intervention did not follow 
revolution in Panama in 1931. No efforts were made to take 
over the Dominican Republic or El Salvador when their govern-
ments defaulted on debt payments to American nationals. The 
last United States marines in l'iicaragua 'Were withdrawn on 
January 2, 1933. Steps were taken to end armed intervention 
in Haiti. Moreover, this country r everted to i ts traditional 
policy of recognition of new governments. On February 6, 1931, 
Secretary of State St,imson repudiated the Vdlsonian policy 
lJ. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine 
(Washington: Government printIng OffTCe:-!930). 
I. 
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of non-recognition of governments of revolutionary origin, 
and the United States promptly recognized revolutionary 
governments in South America, Panama, and the Caribbean 
area. This was an important step; the influence of the 
United States has often been so great that the mere grant-
ing or withholding of recognition has determined the 
1 
existence of governments. 
Armed intervention by the United States was the 
bitterest of all pills for the southern nations to swallow; 
no policy could do more for the sake of inter-.American 
good will than one of non-intervention. ~t an early date, 
President Roosevelt stated his deterillination not to inter-
fere with the internal affairs of Latin American governments; 
on ~ay 16, 1933, he indicated this country's willingness to 
forego the practice of armed intervention, except in accordance 
with existing treaties. 2 At the Seventh Conference of 
iUnerican States held at lvl.ontevideo in 1933, Secretary of 
State Hull affirmed the desire of the United States to end 
such treaty arrangements with all possible speed, but he 
added that "some patience" might be necessary before 
lCf. David H. Popper, "Latin American .iolicy of the 
Roosevelt Administration," Foreign Policl Reports, X, No. 21 
(Dec. 19, 1934), 271. -
2Treaty relations of the United States with SOille 
Caribbean nations, such as the Permanent Treaty of May, 1903, 
with Cuba, and the Canal Agreement of November, 1903, with 
Panama, gave Washington the right to intervene under certain 
circumstances. 
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"disentanglements from obligations" could be effected. l 
During a conference discussion in regard to the 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States a few days 
later, Secretary Hull elaborated upon his previous state-
ment~ He said: 
Under the Roosevelt administration, the United 
States government is as much opposed as any other 
government to interference with the freedom, the 
sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes 
of the governments of other nations • • • • no 
government need fear any intervention on the part 
of the United States under the Roosevelt administra-
tion. 2 
The last word on intervention was given by President 
Roosevelt two days after the adjournment of the Montevideo 
conference. Roosevelt asserted: 
•••• the definite policy of the United States 
from now on is one opposed to armed intervention. 
The maintenance of constitutional government in other 
nations is not, after all, a sacred obligation de-
volving upon the United States alone. The maintenance 
of law and the orderly processes of government in this 
hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation 
within its borders first of all. It is only if and 
when the failure of orderly processes affects the 
other nations of the continent that it becomes their 
concern; and the point to stress is that in such an 
event it becomes the joint concern of3the whole con-tinent in which we are all neighbors. 
These statements, at their face value, represented 
probably the most abrupt change in foreign policy in the 
lMinutes and Antecedents, Seventh International 
Conference ot American States, ~ontevideo, 1933, First 
Committee, p. 24. 
2~., Second Committee, p. 121. 
3Franklin Roosevelt,"Address at the Woodrow Wilson 
Foundation," December 28, 1933 (~ York Times, December 29, 
1933), p. 1. 
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entire history of American foreign relations. a policy 
which had been strongly upheld as late as 1928 by Charles 
Evans Hughes was dropped in 1933 by Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Intervention had for years been the cause of the greatest 
enmity harbored by Latin American nations against the 
United States. The conference at ~ontevideo marked the 
end of that interventionist policy, at least in theory; 
1933 saw a greater cordiality toward the United States on 
the part of its southern neighbors than ever before existed. 
That non-intervention, in fact, was doubted with 
good cause by the Central American republics will be seen 
later. Nevertheless, to some extent, actions backed up 
words. In the spring of 1934, grave disorders in Cuba 
sorely tried the new policy. Although warShips were sent 
to Cuban waters, and although the diplomats of this country 
indulged in much unbecoming activity, troops were not landed. 
The signing of a treaty with Cuba on May 29, 1934, by Which 
the Island was released from the interventionist stipuletions 
of tbe Platt Amendment, was of significance. Three months 
later, the last marines were withdrawn from Haiti. Almost 
Simultaneously, a pact was signed with Fanama removing some 
of the apron strings that had been tied to that country by 
1 the Hay-Buneau-Varilla Treaty of 1903. 
lThe new treaty was not ratified by the Senate until 
July 25, 1939; the delay was caused mostly by OPPOSition by 
the army and navy. 
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Diffioulties with Mexico gave the Good Neighbor 
policy a severe test in 1958 with the Mexican government's 
expropriation of foreign oil holdings. The problem is 
still unsettled, but the non-intervention pledge has not 
been broken. Reciprocal trade agreements have been further 
indices of Pan American cooperation, and the decision to 
give the Philippines their eventual independence has been 
still another straw in the wind of diminishing Yanqui 
Imperialism. 
The first phase of the policy of the United States 
toward Central and South America was one of isolation. 
Still in the colonial stage of its economic development, 
the United States was content to rest almost exclusively 
on the stipulations of ~onroe's doctrine from 1826 to 1889. 
As the tempo of economic development in the United States 
was accelerated, the demand for Latin American raw materials 
and foodstuffs advanced rapidly while, on the other hand, 
the Latin American market for products of this country 
1 
tended to decrease. Largely as a consequence of this 
economic fact, the second and imperialistic phase of Latin 
American polioy was instituted. Marked ohiefly by the 
flagrant use of interventionist doctrine, this era is 
lTrueblood, ££. ~., p. 287. 
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characterized by an ever increasing hostility toward the 
United States on the part of the Central and South American 
nations. 
Franklin Roosevelt has received a disproportionate 
amount of credit for the Good Neighbor, or third, phase of 
this country's Latin American policy, which was really in-
augurated by Herbert Hoover. The Good Neighbor policy has 
1 
specifically meant the following things: 
1. Abandonment of intervention by the United 
States, including the complete withdrawal of all this 
country's forces from the Caribbean countries. Non-inter-
vention, however, means different things to different 
people, and the United States' interpretation has been 
2 
strongly challenged. 
2. Refusal of the government to act as a collec-
tion agency for private debts. 
3. Abandonment of the policy of not recognizing 
revolutionary governments. 
4. Abrogation of the Platt Amendment in the case 
of Cuba, ratification of a new treaty with Panama, with-
drawal of financial control from Haiti. 
5. Attempts to improve trade relations on a 
reciprocal basis. 
lAdapted largely from ~., p. 288 ft. 
2 Ct. infra, p. 23. 
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6. Fostering of inter-American cultural relations. 
7. Strengthening of the machinery to insure inter-
American peace and inter-~erican solidarity against un-
friendly political forces. 
The Good Neighbor policy was not instituted for 
altruistic reasons; it came into being because .American 
profits in Central and South America were drying up during 
a period of world-wide depression and because ill will en-
gendered by imperialism was becoming more vocal, more 
powerful, and more difficult to keep down. On the one hand, 
the Good Neighbor policy is an attempt to make profit with 
honey where vinegar has failed; on the other hand, it is 
an attempt to foster good will and continental solidarity 






The atmosphere of the Seventh International Conference 
of American States, meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, from 
December 3 to December 26, 1933, was most unpropitious for 
discussion of means to insure peace. Uppermost in the minds 
of all the delegates was the fact that the devastating 
Chaco War was still being fought between Bolivia and :Paraguay. 
Other purely American considerations making for pessimism 
were the current Leticia dispute between Colombia and Feruj 
the uncertainties related to the Cuban revolution and 
especially the a ttitude of the United States to that leftist 
movement; the growing li st of debt d efaul ts; and the im-
position of new high tariffs, exchange controls, and quotas 
1 
that were further decreasing inter-American trade. Abroad, 
the failure of the 't"orld Economic Conference, as well as of 
the disarmament negotiations at Geneva, gave further cause 
for gloom. 
In mitigation of the gloom, the Good N°eighbor policy 
was already off to a running start as a result of Hoover's 
administration and Roosevelt's inaugural statement. At 
MonteVideo, Hull's approving stand on non-intervention was 
lCf. Charles A. Thomson, "The Seventh :ian .american 
Conference, ~ntevideo," Foreign $011c1 Reports, X, No. ? 
(dune 6, 1934), 90. ~ 
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not the only fundamental shift in United States policy. 
At previous conferences, the United States had refused to 
discuss such controversial questions as private debts and 
tariff policies; here, however, the reverse ws.s true. In-
deed, Hull's leadership was most marked in the discussion 
of economic measures; his program resulted in a resolution 
to promote trade, reduce tariffs, liberalize commercial 
policies, foster the most-favored-nation principle, and 
favor the establishment of a permanent agency to aid in 
1 
the reduction of trade barriers. 
Hull also put the United States on record as being 
willing to sign, ratify, and keep all the peace pacts that 
2 had been promulgated previously by the American states. 
These included: 
1. The Gondra Treaty for Avoiding and rreventing 
Conflicts, signed at the Fifth Conference at Santiago in 
1923. The characteristic feature of this convention was 
the establishment of a procedure of investigation in the 
case of a conflict, the idea being borrowed from the Bryan 
lFinal Act, Resolution V, p. 6. All Final Acts 
cited are printea-in The International Conferences of 
American states, FirstlSupplement, 1933-1940 (Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940). At 
Montevideo, Resolutions LXXX and LXXXI also dealt with 
the desirability of fostering better inter-American trade 
relations. Cf. also Hull's address introducing Resolution 
V, Dec. 12, 1933, in Report £! ~ Delegates of ~ United 
States to the Seventh International Conference (Washington, 
1934), pp.-rI3 ft. On p. 5 of thIs report, Hull's complete 
plan for economic cooperation introduced at ~ontevideo is 
outlined. 
~inutes ~ Antecedents, Committee I, pp. 23-25. 
A good review of the peace machinery of the American nations 
is found in Alfaro, ~. cit., pp. 44 ff. 
~cooling off" treaties of 1913 and 1914. The Gondra 
Convention excepted some controversies, gave limited 
powers to the permanent commissions, and provided no 
conciliation until commissions of inquiry were formed. 
At the time of ~ontevideo, this treaty had not been 
ratified by Argentina and Bolivia. 
16 
2. The General Treaty of Inter-American Con-
oiliation, signed at Washington in 1929. This treaty 
aimed at remedying defects of the Gondra Convention by 
extending conciliation to "all controversies of any kind 
whioh have arisen or may arise." Here, too the Com-
mission of Inquiry, itself, was allowed to render concili-
ation. The treaty had not been ratified by Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, lionduras, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, or Venezuela. 
3. The General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitra-
tion and the Additional Frotocol of Frogressive Arbitration, 
also Signed at Washington in 1929. Arbitration by these 
pacts was extended to disputes of a legal character only, 
which could not have been settled through diplomatic channels. 
These measures had not been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Faraguay, peru, the United 
States, or Uruguay. 
4. The Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Fact of Non-Aggression 
~nd Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro on October 10, 
1933. This treaty provided that the parties "condemn wars 
17 
of aggression"; agree that disputes of all kinds be settled 
"only by pacific means"; and obligate themselves "to submit 
disputes to the conciliation procedure," with certain ex-
ceptions. The conciliation procedure established in this 
treaty differs in some respects from that in the Convention 
of 1929. In both cases, however, the parties to a dispute 
are not bound by the findings of the Commission. This new 
treaty, entirely unratified at the time of Montevideo, had 
only been signed by ~gentina, Brazil, Ohile, Mexico, Para-
1 
guay and Uruguay. 
Complicated by overlapping and sometimes conflicting 
clauses, these pacts were made ineffective by the lack of 
signatures and ratifications. One of the first acts of the 
Montevideo Oonference, initiated by Argentina and Ohile and 
supported by the United States, was to pass unanimously a 
2 
resolution urging the ratification of these instruments. 
3 
In the resolution, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty was also named. 
As a result of the resolution, a proces-verbal was signed 
before the end of the Conference; all the American govern-
ments signified their intention to ratify the conventions 
lLists of signatures and ratifications from Report 2! 
~ Delegates, p. 8. 
2Final~, Resolution IV, p. 6. 
3Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay 




and pacts in the manner prescribed by each. 
Such a pious promise is a good example of Pan American 
peace machinery at its worst. In January, 1941, despite this 
resolution and one similar to it passed at Buenos aires three 
years later, virtually none of these treaties had been rati-
2 
fied by the requisite number of signatory states. Jirgen~ 
tina is perhaps the worst offender. To date (June, 1941), 
she has ratified only her own Saavedra Lamas Pact: 
After passing resolutions to hurry the ratification 
of a multiplicity of peace treaties, the Conference delegates 
proceeded to add more conventions to the already long list. 
Main result of their efforts was the Additional Frotocol to 
the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation. This 
protocol was the outcome of an effort by a committee of the 
American Institute of International Law to create a permanent 
International Commission of Conciliation of fifteen members 
to take the place of the two commissions previously established 
under the Gondra Treaty of 1923 and the Conciliation Convention 
of 1929. "The Conference doubted the practicability of this 
project and decided in favor of improving and simplifying 
3 
existing machinery.". "Simplification" took the form of 
lproces-verbal of the intention to subscribe to the 
pacts for the settlement of international conflicts by 
pacific means, text from the certified copy in the archives 
of the Pan American Union, in the International Conference 
af American states, first supplement (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1940), p. 124. 
2 See chart, 1'oldeg.,_ p. 102. 
3Report £! 1a! Delegates, p. 10. For the discussion 
on the Protocol, cf. Minutes ~ Antecedents, Committee I, 
pp. 56-61, 71, 87. 
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providing that the two commissions set up by the earlier 
pacts would be formulated as permanent bodies so as to be 
ready to act immediately when controversies arose; formerly, 
the commissions would be formed only after disputes had 
1 
taken place. 
The Conference made other attempts at oiling up the 
creaking peace machine. A resolution on Good Offices and 
Mediation, introduced by the American delegate, J. Reuben 
Clark, was unanimously adopted. It provided that "it shall 
never be deemed an unfriendly act for any State • • • • to 
offer good offices or mediation to other States engaged in 
a controversy," and was intended to supply a means for good 
offices only in those cases in which there was no other 
2 
machinery to function. 
It has been noted that "the question of the Chaco 
and the reestablishment of the peace of the continent was 
:3 
uppermost in the minds of all the delegates." Despi te 
the fact that the agenda carried no item on the Chaco, a 
good part of the time of the First Oommittee on the Organi-
zation of Peace was spent in discussing the Bolivia-Paraguay 
IText of protocol from certified copy in the archives 
of the Fan American Union is printed in ~ Conferences of 
American States, p. 20. 
2Final !£!, Resolution XXXVI, p. 22. 
:3W• Mayer, "Seventh International Conference of American 
States; Review of the Tangible Results," Bulletin of the ~an 
American Union, LXVIII U .. pril, 1934), 2'72. - - -
20 
1 
war and ways and means to end it. In the discussions, 
secretary of State Hull emphasized the fact that every 
effort should be made to bring pressure to bear upon the 
two countries to end their difficulties, especially in view 
of the fact that the Conference was placing such great stress 
on peace machinery. Eloquent remarks on the desirability of 
peace were made by delegates of almost every country. 
The United states, whose opposition to such things 
had been prominent at former conventions, again broke precedent 
at Montevideo when Hull urged the utmost cooperation for the 
solution of the Chaco problem with the League of Nations Com-
mission which was on the scene. A sub-committee, formed to 
discuss peace in the Chaco, devoted its labors almost ex-
clusively to assisting the Commission. On December 15, at 
the same session of Committee I in which the resolution on 
the ratification of peace treaties was approved, telegrams 
were read from the presidents of eight countries, including 
the United States, urging the Conference to do everything 
2 
possible to promote an amicable solution of the Chaco dispute. 
The efforts of the League Commission and the sub-com-
mittee resulted in the Signing of an armistice by Bolivia and 
Paraguay on December 19, 1933. Announcement of the truce at 
the Conference called forth the most enthusiastic tribute. 
IThe question reappears frequently through the Minutes 
and Antecedents, especially of Committee I, pp. 7-65. 
2 ~., pp. 27-28. 
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The Conference adopted a resolution on December 24, 
in which it extended greetings to the League of Nations Com-
mission and reaffirmed its faith in pacific means for the 
1 
settlement of international disputes. At the same session, 
the Conference unanimously adopted a resolution, proposed 
by Secretary Hull, calling the attention of Bolivia and 
Paraguay to their obligations under the Covenant of the 
League of Nations for the submission of their dispute to a 
pacific settlement and requesting the disputants to "accept 
juridical methods for the solution of the dispute, as con-
2 
sistently recommended • • " • • 
Settlement of the Chaco dispute was regarded by 
Conference delegates as one of the high points of their 
achievements. Many self-congratulatory words were wasted, 
however. Before the ink was even dry on the resolution, 
the disputing nations were accusing each other of breaking 
the terms of the truce; and before the first of the year, 
3 
the war was under way in full force again. 
lFinal Act, Resolution LXII, p. 28. This resolution 
also extended a-VOte of applause to Dr. Gabriel Terra, Fresi-
dent of Uruguay, for his previous intervention in the Chaco. 
2Final ~, Resolution XCV, p. 34. 
3Many commentators put blame on Argentine for in-
stigating the Chaco War, for prolonging it, and for the 
combatants' failure to keep the truce. Cf. Carleton Beals, 
The comini Struggle for Latin America (New York: Halcyon 
House, 19 0), pp. 339=!42. argentina's inSincerity seems 
well proved; yet Argentina led in paying lip service to 
Chaco peace at fuontevideo. For comment on situation at 
Montevideo, cf. Charles A. Thompson, ~. ~.J p. 92. 
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The most important single ect of the Oonference in 
the actual cementing of inter-~erican solidarity was the 
1 
Oonvention passed on the Rights and Duties of States. 
Article VIII of this treaty declares that "no state has the 
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
another." During the discussion of this article, Secretary 
Hull made the statement previously noted in regard to the 
approval of the doctrine of non-intervention by the United 
2 
States. His stand was heartily praised in the extravagant 
terms that only Oentral American diplomats still se~ to com-
mand in the days of declining Fourth-of-July oratory. 
Other significant pledges made in the Oonvention in-
clude the following: (l}"The primary interest of states is 
the conservation of peace. Differences of any nature • • • • 
3 
should be settled by recognized pacific methods"; (2)"The 
contracting states definitely establish as a rule of their 
conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial 
acquisitions or ~ecial advantages Which have been attained 
by force •••• the territory of a state is inviolable and 
may not be the object of military occupation nor of other 
measures of force by another state, directly or indirectly, 
lText from certified copy in the archives of the Pan 
American Union in The International Oonferences of American 
States, pp. l20-l2~ 
2 





or for any motive whatever, even temporarily. It It is 
significant that the cautious l'tIlr. Hull signed this treaty 
with a reservation, because within the period of the Con-
ference there was "apparently not time • • • • to prepare 
interpretations and definitions of fundamental terms that 
2 
are embraced in the report." 
Although the entire tenor of the ~ontevideo Con-
ference was one of amicability and cordially-expressed re-
lationships, standing very strongly in contrast to the 
rancor of the Havana meeting five years before, the United 
States did not escape without one challenge to its stated 
good intentions. A statement by a Colombian delegate 
praiSing the United States for not intervening inthe recent 
Cuban revolution was challenged strongly by Angel Alberto 
Giraudy, President of Cuba's delegation. Senor Giraudy 
stated: 
It is not possible to remain silent when it is af-
firmed that the United States does not wish to intervene 
in Cub~, because this is not true. If intervention 
means •••• the actual occupation of a country, the 
subjugation of peoples, then the statement is correct. 
But if it is not intervention when in a defenseless 
nation a representative of the United States incites 
lArticle 11. 
2Brazil and Peru also signed with reservations, stat-
ing that they accepted the prinCiple stated in Article 11 
but "do not oonsider it oodifiable because there are same 
countries that have not yet signed the Anti-War Pact of 
Rio de Janeiro of which this doctrine is a part • • • • It 
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1 
part of the people against the government • • • • ; 
if it is not intervention to surround a defenseless 
island by a threatening fleet in an attempt to im-
pose upon it a government it does not desire; then 
there has never been any intervention in America."2 
This statement was greeted by no applause, as far as the 
record shows, but there is no doubt that the Cuban delegate 
3 was expressing a thought held in common by many present. 
Throughout the Conference, the ~exican delegates, 
who represented one of the few actual working democracies 
in the hemisphere, found themselves leading in the intro-
duction of measures on which no action was taken. An 
elaborate peace code, designed to coordinate in one docu-
ment all the features of the various peace treaties, was 
presented. The only objections expressed to it were on the 
grounds of its all-inclusiveness. It was too big.a single 
step forward. The Conference, "bearing in mind the advan-
tages which could be offered by the concentration" resolved 
that the project should be submitted to the consideration 
of the governments belonging to the Fan American Union.
4 
lA reference to the activities of Undersecretary 
Sumner Welles who actively opposed the liberal government 
of Grau San Martin in favor of more conservative regimes. 
Cf. Beals, ~. ~., pp. 226-230. 
2~inutes ~ Antecedents, p. 34. 
3The efforts of the United States were, in great 
measure, responsible for the defection of the Grau San ~artin 
government and the final stability of the military dictator-
ship of General Fulgencio Batista. Cf. infra, p. 105. 
4F1nal Act, Resolution XXXV, p. 16. 
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A good example of how such excellently conceived projects can 
be lost in the labyrinth of Pan American relations is afforded 
by the ~exican Peace Code. It was submitted in amended form 
to the Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of peace 
in 1936, which, in turn, submitted it to the Oommittee of 
Experts for the Codification of International Law, \0 be re-
I 
ported upon at the Eighth Conferenoe at Lima in 1938. The 
Eighth Conference again passed the buok back to the Oommittee 
of Experts and asked that it be broaohed at the Ninth Con-
2 
ference in 1942: Though many diplomats have paid verbal 
homage to this code, its chances of passage seem just as 
slim for 1942 as they were in 1933. 
The Mexican delegate, Puig Oasauranc, also expressed 
an eloquent desire to have the problem of debts, bimetallism, 
a continental centrel bank, and other important economio 
3 
problems discussed at the Oonference. The United 3t~tes and 
Argentina opposed discussing these problems on the ground that 
the Oonference was not prepared to deal with such subjects. 
The project was lost in the maze of the organization and was 
4 finally referred to a Pan American finanoial conference. 
p. 16. 
IFinal~, Buenos Aires Oonference, Resolution XXVIII, 
2Final ~, Eighth Conferenoe, Resolution XV, p. 38. 
3Reports ~ ~ Delegates, p. 26. 
4Final ~, Resolution I, p. 5. Of. infra, p. 94. 
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In evaluating the influence of any of the Conferences 
of American States, one is impressed, first, with the amazing 
amount of verbiage and the plethora of relatively unimportant 
resolutions that, at ~ontevideo, ranged from the campaign 
against the locusts to the problem of lending dignity to 
labor. These matters clutter up the record and the delegates' 
time; at the Seventh Conference, for example, the United States 
found itself in a minority of one arguing against a convention 
on the nationality of women and spending considerable effort 
in upholding its position. The problem is to extract the im-
portant factors from the limbo of well-meaning platitudes. 
There is no doubt that at Montevideo the conditional 
acceptance by the United States of the principle of non-inter-
vention was the foremost achievement of the Conference. With-
out such a stand, there could have been no hope of ever achiev-
ing unity among the Americas. With the stand, a degree of 
unity became possible; but it cannot be said that the Seventh 
Conference capitalized on the opportunity. 
The political agreements arrived at, such as the proces-
verbal of the intention to subscribe to the pacts for the 
pacific settlement of international conflicts, were of the 
first degree of unimportance. If a nation has the intention 
of ratifying peace pacts, this adherence will follow in the 
normal course of that nation's foreign policy. If, however, 
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a nation's foreign policy does not include the adherence to 
such pacts, no additional agreements promising to adhere 
will have any effect whatsoever. There is no better case 
1 
in point than the policy of Argentina. 
The high-sounding resolutions and conventions, given 
so much attention by the Conference prove, on critical exami-
nation, little more than words, words, words; proposals with 
teeth in them, such as the Mexican Feace Code, were passed 
over entirely by the Conferenc.~. 
The economic aChievements of the Seventh Conference 
lay also in the realm of potentialities rather than actualities, 
as far as the promotion of inter-American solidarity was con-
cerned. Secretary Hull's program for reciprocal trade ag~ee-
ments and for the scaling do~n of tariff barriers received 
widespread approval. The agreements reached, however, were 
in the form of non-obligatory resolutions. And the important 
proposals of Mexico were passed over completely. In a like 
fashion, the codification of international law received marked 
impetus at ~ontevideoJ but could achieve significance only 
through the willingness of the states concerned to adhere to 
2 
the legal system being finely fashioned. 
From another aspect, the very fact that the twenty-one 
1 
Supra, p. 18. 
2Final Act, Resolution LXX, p. 28 proposed improved 
methods for the-;Qdification of international law. 
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American states were ~illing to send delegates to discuss 
openly important political, economic, and juridical ~uestions 
was a significant phenomenon in a world which, even then, was 
turning away from the conference table to the battlefield. 
~d it is in the intangible area of fostering favorable public 
opinion that perhaps the greatest achievements of ~ontevideo 
rest. Intangible, but marked, too, was the general feeling 
of cordiality among the delegates; yet the same sense of well-
being might have been gained ade~uately and less hypocritically 
at a ban~uet table rather than at a conference table. Atter-
dinner speeches are not taken so seriously as peace pledges. 
The Seventh Conference was jarred from its own self-
esteem by (1) accusations in the back rooms that Argentina 
was actively aiding Paraguay carryon hostilities against 
Bolivia, while. at the same time, professing to be in strong-
1 
est sympathy with the peace movement; and (2) outspoken 
criticism fro~ CUba of the current interpretation of non-
intervention by the United States. 
Secretary Hull. in usual diplomatic fashion, confused 
the expressed intent with the actuality when he stated the 
results of the Conference in the following fashion: 
A great new epoch in our relations has been born. 
A mighty new era of permanent friendliness, understanding, 
economic peace and cultural cooperation, and all-~erican 
solidarity has been inaugurated. We have outlawed war ~d 
con~uest and embarked upon our peaceful destiny • • • • 
lOft supra, note 3, p. 21. 
2Cordell Hull, Speech at Lima, Peru, January 11, 1934, 
~uoted in the Report of the Delegates, p. 69. 
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BUENOS AIRES, 1936 
The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance 
of peace met at the suggestion of President Roosevelt at 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, from December 1 to December 23, 
1936. In identical notes, addressed to the heads of the 
American republics, Roosevelt called attention to the fact 
that the peace protocol recently negotiated between Bolivia 
and paraguay offered "an altogether favorable opportunity" 
for the American states "to consider their joint responsi-
bility and their common need of rendering less likely in 
the future the outbreak or the continuation of hostilities 
• • • • and by so do ing, serve in an eminently practical 
manner the cause of permanent peace on this Western Conti-
1 
nent." 
Although the European situation found no pla.ce in 
the official story of Buenos Aires, the effect of the 
European backdrop on the American stage cannot be gainsaid. 
The League of Nations had further demonstrated its inefficacy 
by failing to do anything about either the Italian conquest 
lCircular letter from the President of the United 
States to the Presidents of the other American Republics 
proposing the convocation of the Conference, Inter-American 
Conference for the Maintenance of Peace •••• Special 
Handbook for the Use of Delegates (Washington: The Pan 
American Union;-19~)-:-pp. 1-3. 
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of Ethiopia, oonsummated in the previous summer; or the oivil 
war in Spain, still raging after more than a year and a half; 
or the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, aooomplished 
in the previous Maroh. These ~~re further indioations that the 
deoline of the Versailles Peaoe and the League of Nations was 
oontinuing at full paoe. Europe's peaoe had already been 
broken and there seemed no possibility of mending it. Amerioa's 
war had just ended and the time seemed ripe to take steps in-
suring oontinuation of the peaoe. 
The purpose of the Conferenoe, as outlined in the 
President's invitation, was to determine how the maintenanoe 
of peaoe might best be safeguarded -- ~hether, perhaps, 
through the prompt ratifioation of all the Amerioan peaoe 
instruments, already negotiated; whether through the amend-
ment of existing peaoe instruments • • • • ; or perhaps through 
the oreation by oommon aooord of new instruments of peaoe ad-
di tional to those already formulated." 
The twenty-one Amerioan states unanimously approved 
President Roosevelt's suggestions; the Conferenoe met on 
sohedule, and, although the original intention was to oonfine 
it to problems of peaoe, the program was ultimately extended 
to oover almost the soope of the preceding Montevideo meeting. 
Of the sixty-four resolutions and tVi"elve oonventions, the 
four most important to inter-Amerioan solidarity were: 
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1. The Convention for the Maintenanoe, Preservation, 
and Reestablishment of Peaoe. (Known as the Consultative 
Pact.) 
2. The Additional protocol Relative to Non-Inter-
vention. 
3. The Declaration of Prinoiples of Inter-American 
Solidarity and Cooperation. 
4. The Convention to Coordinate, Extend, and ~sure 
the Fulfillment of the Existing Feace Treaties between Ameri-
can States. 
Terms of the Convention for the Maintenance, Preserva-
tion and Reestablishment of Peace were an adaptation of a 
projeot submitted by Brazil which, using the language of the 
original message of President ~onroe in 1823, stated that 
the oontracting powers "would consider as an unfriendly act 
the interference of any extra-continental power with an 
Amerioan country, whenever suoh interference should threaten 
the security of that country or else directly or indirectly 
endanger its territorial integrity or determine the exercise, 
1 
in any form, of a preponderant influence in its destiny. tt 
Thus, the Brazilian proposal sought to make the ~onroe Doctrine 
the common doctrine of all the American states. 
'l'his direct challenge to Europe, however, encountered 
opposition from 4rgentina, especially. ConseQuently, the 
IDiario de la Conferencia, p. 500, quoted in Ricardo 
. "T'"':"'-
J. iufaro, 2£.. ~., p. 95. 
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pro j ect Vias revised; as finally accepted, it referred in 
vague terms to the situation arising "in the event that the 
peace of the American republics was menaced," and it called 
in such event f or mutual consultation by the American stCites, 
"for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful 
cooperation. tt 
Article II of the Convention goes beyond the scope 
of the ~onroe Doctrine. It deals with two distinct situations; 
one arising in the event of 9. Yoar between .American states, the 
other in the event of "an international war outside .a::nerica." 
Provision is made for consultation among the ~erican govern-
ments in both cases. In the former, consultation has as its 
object, "a method of peaceful collaboration.tI In the more 
important case of a war outside America, language of the treaty 
reached its high point of saying nothing; consultation is to 
take place "to detennine the proper time and manner in Which 
the signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually co-
operate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the 
1 
American continent." 
It is somewhat ironical that Argentina, and not the 
United States, retarded the scrapping of the unilateral Monroe 
Doctrine; this country was willing to go the entire distance 
in setting up mutual guarantees of collective security in 
IText from certified copy in the Archives of the 
Department of State; printed in The International Conferences 
of American States, p. 188. EcuadOr and Honduras Signed wIth 
mrnor reservatIons. 
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in the hemisphere. Argentina was loath to slap at her good 
customer, Germany. The southern republic desired, of course, 
to retain the relinquishment of the United States' right of 
solo action; at the same time, she did not want to clasp 
hands too tightly with the United States and thus prevent 
her from reaching out to Europe. 
To call the result a convention of "very guarded 
1 
language" is to pay it too high a compliment. It is a con-
venti on whose language allows the signatories almost precisely 
the freedom of action they had before it existed. The in-
nocuous brand of consultation provided, in the case of an 
extra-continental threat, is softened further by "if they 
so desire"; lack of any machinery of consultation is further 
evidence of lack of real intent to take effective unified 
action. For the sake of unanimity, the convention had all 
its teeth drawn. 
The most important effect of this treaty was probably 
a psychological one. Though "cont inentallzing tf the .1W.onroe 
Doctrine was not accomplished in fact, the support of the 
United States was bound to cement more friendly relations 
with the southern republics in this new manifestation of 
the Good Neighbor policy. yet from the viewpoint of the 
United States, the result was no cause for self-congratulation; 
the country gave up a policy of long standing in exchange for 
a mess of words signifying nothing. 
lCf. Charles G. Fenwick, "The Buenos Aires Conference: 
1936," Foreign Policy RePorts, XIII, l~o. 8 (July 1, 1937) 
p. 92. Professor Fenwick's review is able, albeit over-o;ti-
mistic. 
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The assoaiation of the Additional ~rotocol Relative 
to Non-Intervention with the Oonsultative ~act was by no 
means accidental. If the latter ever ~orked, its machinery 
of consultation would make domination on the part of the 
leading state of the continent easily possible. The 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of states 
had laid down the prinCiple that "no state has the right 
1 
to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." 
The Additional Protocol, for no discernible reason except 
to allay fears of the South and Central American states, re-
affirmed this prinCiple, declaring "inadmissible" the inter-
vention of anyone of the contracting parties "directly or 
indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or ex-
ternal affairs of any of the other parties." It also pro-
vided that "the violation of the provisions • • • • shall 
give rise to mutual consultation, with the object of exchang-
2 
ing views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment ... 
Like the Additional protocol, the Declaration of 
Inter-American Solidarity, presented by the combined Central 
American delegations, contained little or nothing new in the 
field of inter-American peace machinery. A preamble recited 
the existence of common ideals of peace and justice and the 
1 Cf. supra, p. 22. 
2Text from certified copy in the Department of State; 
printed in International Conf~rences of American States, 
PP. 191-192. --
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necessity of making a declaration of "principles of American 
int~rnational law, by which is understood a moral union of 
all the American republics • • • • " and "the principle of 
American solidarity in all non-continental American con-
I 
flicts." The declaration then asserted the "absolute 
juridical liberty" of the American nations and "their unre-
stricted respect f or their respective sovereignties" and the 
"existence of a common democracy throughout ..cWerica"; it 
enumerates as prinCiples accepted by the .iwlerican community 
of nations: 
(a) proscription of territorial conquests and that, 
in consequence, no acquisition made through violence 
shall be recognized; (b) intervention by one state in 
the internal or external affairs of another state is 
condemned; (c) forcible collection of pecuniary debts 
is illegal; and (d) any difference or dispute between 
the American nations •••• shall be settled by the 
methods of conciliation, or unrestricted arbitration, 
or through operations of international justice. 
Again one is left overwhelmed with the words but un-
impressed with the effect. ~ain, too, the only teeth of 
the original document were extracted by the Argentine delegates. 
This was a statement to the effect that "all the American 
nations will consider as an attack upon themselves individually 
an attack which may be made by any nation upon the rights of 
,,2 another • • • • 
lFinal~, Resolution XXVII, p. 16. 
2Diario de la Conferencia, p. 493, quoted in FenWick, 
.2£0 cit., p. 94.--
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Argentine oonservatism also won at the expense of the 
program of the United states in the drafting of the Convention 
1 
on Treaty Coordination and Neutrality. In the original draft 
prepared by t.he delegation of the United states,provision 
had been made for the creation of a "permanent inter-~erican 
conSUltative committee." Determined OPPOSition from the 
Argentine delegation to the creation of this committee was 
partly on the ground that it suggested a politioal organiza-
tion of the oontinent contrary to the policy consistently 
followed with regard to the Pan American Union, and partly 
on the ground that it appeared to be an attempt to set up a 
sort of League of American Nations in opposition to the League 
2 
at Geneva. Although neither objeotion seemed particularly 
germane, the United States dropped the proposal purely for 
the sake of harmony. In the place of the permanent committee 
Was substituted the bare obligation to consult, without reference 
to any machinery of conSUltation. The Convention, as finally 
passed, rep eated the Montevideo attempt to coordinate and make 
more effective the five previously signed peace conventions 
:3 
for the continent; set forth, in case peace failed, the 
IThe ~ontevideo Resolution had been largely ignored. 
At the time of the Conferenoe only seven countries (The United 
States, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, ~exico, Nicaragua, 
and Salvador) had ratified all the important American peace 
treaties. 
2Cf • Fenwick, ~. £il., p. ~5. 
3Articles I and II', Text of the oonvention from oerti~ 
fied copy in the Department of State; printed in International 
Oonferences ~ American States, pp. 1~2~1~7. Argentina, Fara-
guay, El Salvador, Colombia signed the convention with reserva-
tions. A resolution, No. III, was also passed relative to 
ratification of peace treaties. 
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desirability on the part of the contraoting states, of adopting, 
"in their character as neutrals a common and solid attitude, in 
order to discourage or prevent the spread or prolongation of 
1 
hostilities"; and described criteria f or determining when 
hostilities became war and when neutrality proposals would 
2 
come into effect. 
The treaty again demonstrated praiseworthy, verbal in-
tentions of the American states; aside from this, however, it 
was moribund from birth as the re sult of innumerl;ible exceptions 
possible under its terms, intentionally vague language, and 
complicated, ill-defined overlapping with previous treaties. 
That these four measures, with all their weaknesses, 
were the outstanding steps taken towards ~an American solidarity 
at the Buenos Aires Conference demonstrates the mediocre ac-
complishments of that meeting. Yet an analysis of the final 
act reveals very little else of any consequence whatever. The 
resolution on the lLnitation of armaments was a case in 
3 
point. In all the annals of all international conferences, 
there is probably no more pious, more contradictory, and more 
lArticle VII. No obligation existed Where the neutrality 
measures ceme into conflict with previously signed pacts; thus, 
for the sixteen of the twenty-one states who were members of the 
League of Nations, the neutrality terms of the treaty were 
largely nullified. 
2Article V. The original proposal of the United States 
provided for an arms embargo, the prohibition of loans and the 
restriction of trade to all belligerent states; this was in ac-
oordance with the existing neutrality legislation of the United 
States. The proposal met with unqualified disapproval of all 
the other states and was therefore dropped. 
3Final ~, Resolution XXXIII, p. 18. 
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meaningless act. With any possibility of a system of collective 
security ruled out by the convention conservatives, the best 
that could be done was to recommend that all governments "which 
consider themselves in a position to do so" conclude agreements 
for limiting "their armaments to the greatest possible extent, 
within the requirements of internal order, and the justified 
defense of their sovereignty:" 
Attacking the evils of militarism fram another angle, 
the Conference went on record formally repudiating war as a 
means of settling differences between states and recommending 
1 
the "humanization ot war" where and when it occurred. A 
project on the definition of an aggressor, presented by Bolivia 
and Brazil, was altogether too controversial to handle; it was 
referred to the Committee of Experts in charge of the codifica-
2 
tion of law. Additional treaties Signed on (1) the Frevention 
of Controversies and (2) Good Offices and ~ediation were of 
3 
little or no consequence. As a matter of fact, they probably 
weakened the structure of pan American peace machinery by 
establishing overlapping means of settlement, less binding 
than others previously provided. 
lFinal !£!, Resolution XXXIV. 
2~., Resolution XXX, p. 17. 
3The former established permanent bi-lateral commissions 
to study, with the object of eliminating, causes for future con-
troversies and to propose additional lawful measures; the latter 
provided that when controversies arise that cannot be settled by 
diplomatiC means, the disputant nations have recourse to the 
mediation of "an eminent citizen" of any of the other American 
countries. Texts from certified copies in the Department of 
State, in ~ International Conferences ~ American States, 
pp. 197-201. 
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It oannot be said that the eoonomio steps taken were 
any more impressive. The Montevideo Conferenoe had adopted 
a resolution whioh was both a declaration of prinoiples and 
a program of "eoonomio disarmament. ff There was little left 
to do, unless the Conferenoe was willing to take specifio 
and definite steps. The Conferenoe wasn't willing; it there-
fore merely repeated reoommendations for the prinoiple of 
1 
abolishing or reduoing trade restrictions in general, and 
for the somewhat contradictory prinoiple of equality of treat-
2 
ment in respect to whatever restriotions might be maintained. 
Both resolutions carried the inevitable qualification that the 
polioies were to be put into effect to the extent to whioh 
"the different national economies" permitted. 
The most definite results of the Feace Conference, 
strangely enough, were in the field of cultural and intellec-
tual oooperation and "moral disarmament. tI Twenty-three of the 
sixty-two resolutions adopted dealt with these topics; one of 
the most significant measures was the Convention for the Pro-
motion of Inter-American Oultural Relations, which provided 
for an annual exchange of students and professors between each 
3 
of the Pan Amerioan states. The Conferenoe referred to the 
IFinal ~, Resolution XLVI, p. 23. 
2Final ~, Resolution XLIV, p. 22. 
3Text from oertified oo;;y in the Department of State, 
printed in The International Conferenoes of ~erican States, 
Pl'. 203-205:--
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next meeting the proposal for a permanent Inter-american Court, 
which had been backed by Oosta Rica, Salvador, Guatemala, and 
1 
Nicaragua. 
Throughout the Oonference, more so than at any previous 
one, the nations of the two americas were clearly divided in 
their viewpoints. Argentina, supported by Ohile and Uruguay, 
represented the conservative European opinion. These countries 
stood in favor of universalism, leaguismj stood opposed to 
any strong regional understandings, to expreSSions of conti-
nental solidarity, to an American League of Nations, to the 
Tf continentalizing" of the Jltionroe Doctrine, and to a permanent 
Inter-American Court. The Dominican Republic and Oolombia 
represented the opposite extreme, with recommendations for 
2 
full-fledged American Leagues of Nations; Mexico and Venezuela, 
urging a unified peace code, stood close to the left with the 
five Central American nations in a bloc of partial support; 
the latter were successful in their advocacy of the resolution 
of continental solidarity. The United states, Brazil, and 
Cuba were the centrists of the Conference, being pulled too 
far toward the right extreme for the fulfillment of their re-
1 . 
~., Resolution IV, p. 7. 
2Ibid., Resolution X, p. 9 took cognizance of the two 
projects,-aeclaring that complicating factors made the topic 
"not sufficiently ripe," and recommending that the two states 
reconcile the differences in their respective drafts; it re-
solved to include the project on the agenda of the Eighth 
Oonference at Lima. Bolivia, Cuba, and Ecuador, in addition 
to the Dominic~ Republic and Bolivia, urged that the union 
be discussed. 
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spective programs but suffering the compromise for the sake 
1 
of Conference unanimity. 
On one point the United states did not compromise. 
This was the resolution on the coordination of the pacific 
instruments with the Covenant of the League of Nations; this 
measure recommended that the American states which were members 
of the League and signatories of the Pact of Paris, the Saavedra 
Laamas Treaty and "any such agreements signed in the future" 
should request of states that were not melDbers of the League 
but were parties to the other treaties that they cooperate with 
the League. This cooperation would take the form of studying 
projects for the coordination of these instruments with the 
Covenant and with measures that Geneva might adopt to prevent 
war or to settle disputes by pacific means. Despite broad 
qualifications allowed in the resolution, the delegates of 
the United states abstained from voting f or the measure which 
would have pledged their country to cooperate with the League. 
It is worth noting that the Argentine delegates, who urged this 
resolution, were not willing to drop it as the re,Presentatives 
of the United states had dropped projects when unanimity was 
not possible. Passage of the resolution was a clear victory 
for Argentina over the United States, for the adherents of 
universal action over the supporters of hemispheric action. 
Another resolution solidified the victory; it provided that 
IPaul Vanorden Shaw, "Buenos Aires," reprinted from 
Ngrth American Review (March, .1957), pp. 24~41, in ~ Reference 
S elf, XII, Ne. 6 (1958), p. 153. 
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"treaties and conventions adopted at Inter-American Conferences 
shall be open to accession or adherence of the &nerican states 
which may not have signed them •••• (the same) shall be open 
1 
to all states whenever it is so provided in such instruments." 
To this the United States acceded. 
Virtually every step taken forward at Buenos Aires 
was accompanied by a qualification somewhat negating the total 
gains. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine was tacitly amplified into 
a multi-lateral agreement by the Consultative Fact; but any 
genuine advance in inter-American unity that might have been 
achieved through such an a greemen twas e ffecti vely emasculated 
by the substitution of the vague Argentinian wording for the 
clearcut statement presented by Brazil. Thus, the prinCiple 
of conSUltation was established in any contingenoy; but the 
permanent consultative committee had to be 'dropped; and only 
a pious resolve was substituted for it. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that insofar as legal 
obligations and expressions of idealistic objectives are con-
cerned, the Conference was unqualifiedly successful. .trin-
oiples of equality of states and of non-intervention received 
new confirmation; repudiation of war and territorial conquest, 
although along familiar lines, can scarcely be criticized for 
repetition; the economic resolutions can only be lauded for 
1 
Final~, Resolution V, p. 2. 
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the lip service they paid to the principle of free trade. 
Furthermore, mobilization of public opinion on behalf of 
pacific settlement caused by the Convention itself and pro-
vided for, indirectly, through the Consultative Convention 
1 
was a genuine and valuable factor. 
Yet what might have been done impresses one more 
strongly than what actually was accomplished. The treaties 
of Buenos Aires, with those preceding them, created no definite 
system or procedure of consultation. In case of a conflict, 
there were many overlapping jurisdictions, providing possi-
bilities of delay and duplication of efforts. Frocedures 
were ill defined, and there were so many different courses 
to follow that chances for successful peaceful settlement 
were slim indeed. The need for careful coordination of the 
agreements and unification of the procedures could have been 
met by the adoption of a single document, such as the lJexican 
I'eace Oode J or the adoption of separate J but harmonious Con-
2 
ventions, which together could form one structure. Instead, 
Buenos Aires added willy-nilly to the numerous conventions 
existing and postponed consideration of the Mexican proposal. 
lCf. Re!ort of the Delegates of the United ~tates of 
.America to the 'nter:::im:ertcan Conference"fOr the ~aintenanCi 
of Paace\Washington: United States Goverruneii't"frinting Office, 
193?), p. ? 
9 
.... Samuel Guy Inman, Building an Inter-.american l~eighbor­
hood, "World Affairs Books," ~o. 20 (New York: National Feace 
c:onrerence, 193?), p. 50. 
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A fundamental reason for the lack of success at all 
the conferences of the glibly labeled "AiJlerican dem.ocracies" 
was well demonstrated at Buenos Aires. The countries meet-
ing there, in the first place, were not democracies; they 
were engaged in heated economic rivalries; they were split 
fundamentally on the problem of ~ericanism versus univer-
salism; they were, in large part, closer to ~urope than to 
each other, culturally and ethnically. 
Of the states represented at Buenos ~res, only the 
United States, kexico, Costa Rica, ranama, and Colombia were 
not at least benevolent dictatorships. Fresident Roosevelt, 
who addressed the Conference, asserted that "Democracy is 
1 
still the hope of the world." Yet, in seventeen or eighteen 
of the nations represented, constitutional representative 
government was honored habitually in the breach, executives 
normally overrode the legislative and judicial arms of the 
government, and electoral machinery was rendered more or 
less meaningless by coercion or fraud. In the newly formed 
dictatorship in Cuba, the army head of state was bulldozing 
his congress and imprisoning political dissenters; in the 
Dominican Republic, President Trujillo was killing or con-
fining his political opponents; in Brazil, Fresident Vargas 
was keeping his critics in jail; in Uruguay, President Terra 
had flatly banned all political debates; in :peru, :fresident 
lFranklin D. Roosevelt, text of address in "The 
Inter-American Conference for the kaintenance of Peace," 
International ConCiliation (New York: Carnegie Endowment 
for International peace, ~arch, 1937), No. 328, pp. 209-214. 
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Benavides had recently cancelled an election when it was 
apparent that he was losing; in Bolivia, in Faraguay, and 
in Argentina, military dictatorship and feudal aristocracy 
1 
held absolute control. 
There could be no stranger setting imaginable for 
a speech by an American president to state that "we stand 
shoulder to shoulder in our final determination that 
others • • • • will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to 
consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good." 
The wonder is that the Buenos Aires Conference accomplished 
what little it did. 
lCf. Norbert Herring, "Exit the ~onroe Doctrine; 





The Eighth International Conference of American 
States convened at Lima, Feru, under the handicap of great 
expectations, on December 9, 1938. The program for the 
Conference carried most Significant and far reaching items: 
) 
(1) Ferfection and coordination of inter-~erican 
peace instruments (including topics on investigation, 
conciliation and arbitration, and the Code of :Peace; 
definition of the aggressor, sanctions, and the 
strengthening of means f or the prevention of war); 
(2) Creation of an .I~ter-AmeriCan Court of Inter-
national Justice; (3) Creation of a League or 
~sociation of ~erican Nations; (4) Declaration 
with respect to the American doctrine of the non-
reoognition of territory acquired by force •••• 
~l this was included under the section on the 
organization of peace; economic problems to be discussed 
1 
were no less promising of large forward steps. 
To the United States, especially, the promises held 
forth by the Lima program were twice welcome 0 Two dangers 
had arisen which seemed to threaten the increasing cordiality 
among American nations resulting from the continuation of the 
Good Neighbor policy and. the final settlement of peace in the 
Chaco. On the one hand, the Cardenas policy of expropriation 
had caused friction between Mexico and the United States and 
lFrogram of the Eighth International Conference of 
~erican States in Special Handbook ~ the ~ 2! Delegates 
(Washington: The Fan Jimerican Union, 1938), p. 3. 
47 
had awakened fears regarding the position of foreign capital 
in other Latin .America countries. On the other hand, the 
drive of the Fascist powers to extend their influence in the 
4mericas had increased since the Munich agreement and during 
1 
the losing fight of the Loyalists in Spain. 
Significantly enough, the .merican -democracies· 
deliberated at Lima in the hall of the Chamber of Deputies 
which had not been used since the Chamber had met and been 
2 
dismissed two years before. Aside from. the Declaration of 
Lima, which, despite many ~ualifications, went beyond all 
previous statements of inter-American solidarity, the achieve-
ments of the Eighth Conference were disappointing. 
The focal point of interest at Lima, from first to 
last, was the ~uestion of in ter-..iWl.erican solideri ty. With 
Secretary Hull as the spokesman, the American delegation 
offered a program that strongly stressed the determination 
of the American nations to oppose either a military or an 
ideological invasion of the Western Hemisphere. In his 
opening address, Hull asserted that "an ominous shadow falls 
athwart our own continent.- He further declared: "There 
must not be a shadow of a doubt anywhere a s to the determination 
lCf. Charles .... Thomson, "Results of the Lima Conference J" 
Foreign I'olicy RePorts, XY, no. l",(March 15, 1939}, 1. 
2New York Times, December 10. 1938, p. 8. Another note, 
somewhat Off pitch, was an early speech by Feru's Dr. Carlos 
Conda in Which he warned against implanting dartificial methods 
of commerce on this continent"; at the time,~Peru was carrying 
on a thriving barter trade with Germany. 
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of the American nations not to permit the invasion of this 
hemisphere by the armed forces of any power or any possible 
combination of powers." With no less zest, Hull criticized 
doctrines and activities "utilized for the purpose of under-
mining and destroying in other nations established institu-
1 
tions of government and basic social order." 
The concern of the United States to develop more ef-
fective inter-American cooperation against political and 
cultural penetration and possible armed aggression was sub-
stantially supported at Lima by a Caribbean bloc of some 
twelve nations, made up of Mexioo, the Central American 
oountries, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and the three west 
Indian republics. As at Buenos Aires, Argentina, supported 
by the neighboring state of Uruguay and, to a lesser degree, 
by Paraguay and Bolivia, expressed a different point of view. 
Determined by reasons of their own national selt-interest, 
the policy ot these oountries indioated no alarm at any 1m-
2 
mediate Nazi-Fasoist menaoe. The task ot the Conterence 
was to reconoile the oonflicting points ot view and at the 
same t1me evolve a meaningful policy. 
When the United States delegation was still en route 
to Lima, an Argentine draft on inter-American solidarity was 
IText ot speeoh is in ~., December 11, 1938, p. 14. 
2Cf• Thomson,"Results of the Lima Conference," Foreign 
Policy Reports, XV, No. 1 (March 15, 1939), 3. The!!! York 
Times of Deoember 13, p. 2, carried a story to the etfec~at 
BrazIl, Chile, and Argentina were atraid that any statement of 
solidarity would bring economic reprisals from Germany. 
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forwarded from Buenos £ires; it contained suggestions for 
extending consultation to cover more than simply the threats 
to peace specified in the Consultative Pact of the 1936 meeting. 
The draft contained reference to COmI~on action against aggres-
sion, simply providing for general or regional meetings of the 
l\a.inisters of Foreign Affairs of the ADlerican States, t'when 
1 ~ 
they deem it advisable. n This was patently not strong enough 
"'I 
for the ~erican delegation. 
Immediately upon his arrival at Lima, Secretary Eull 
discussed the solidarity question with Foreign Minister 
2 
Cantilo of Argentina and other delegates. It was agreed that 
the proposed measure should be reduced in technical rank from 
a treaty to a declaration, and that the two questions of soli-
darity and consultation be temporarily separated, while at-
tempts were made to fashion a formula for each. Meanwhile, 
on shipboard, the United states delegates had revised the 
Argentine draft and had included a provision expressing common 
concern in opposing subversive movements. In his address to 
the Conference on December 10, Dr. Cantilo coupled a pledge 
1 Discussion of the solidarity agreement closely follows 
that of Charles Thomson's report and of the ~ York Times. 
Text of the Argentine draft is in Diario de la VIII Conferencia 
Internacional Americana, Lima, No. 7~ (December 14, 1935), p. 434. 
2Cantilo was not at Lima as a delegate, although he 
addressed the conference. His visit was for six days, and for 
a time there was feverish haste to evolve an acceptable soli-
darity agreement before he left for Buenos Aires. Cf. New 
York Times, week of December 9. ---
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of general willingness to oppose aggression with refusal to 
1 
bind Argentina to specific commitments. 
Two days later the ~gentine Foreign Minister left 
Lima with no agreement having been reached and with the morale 
of the Conference at its low point. On his way home, Cantilo 
dispatched a second ~gentine draft. Brazil, Ouba, and 
Mexico, however, urged a stronger statement. Aa a consequence, 
a third formula was worked out by delegates from ~eru, Brazil, 
and Argentina, which was hastily dispatched to Buenos ~res. 
Oantilo, however, flatly rejected this draft. There was nothing 
to do but to return to Argentina's second formula; this was 
done, and the problem seemed to have been solved. The 
Brazilian delegation threw a scare into the Oonference, however, 
When it suspended action on the draft on orders from the home 
government; it was only on December 24 that unanimous agree-
ment became possible. Consideration of the Declaration had 
consumed almost the entire time, effort, and patience of the 
Oonference. wVhat did the all-important document say? 
The Declaration first made note of the doubtful fact 
that ttthe people of America have achieved spiritual unity 
through the similarity of their republican institutions, their 
unshakable will for peace, their profound sentiment of humanity 
and tolerance, and through their absolute adherence to the 
principles' of international law. ff It then reaffirmed "the 
lDiario, No.5, December 11, 1938, p. 281. 
51 
oontinental sOlidarity· of the 4merioan republios and tttheir 
purpose to oollaborate in the maintenanoe of the prinoiples 
upon whioh the said solidarity is based • • • • their de-
oision to maintain them (the above mentioned prinoiples) and 
to defend them against all foreign intervention or aotivity 
that may threaten them. It It further proolaimed for the .iJJleri-
oan states that "in a ase the p eaoe, seouri ty or territorial 
integrity is thus threatened by aots of any nature that may 
impair them, they proolaim their oommon oonoern and their de-
termination to make effeotive their solidarity, ooordinating 
their respeotive sovereign wills by means of the prooedure of 
oonsultation •••• using the measures whioh in eaoh oase the 
oiroumstanoes may make advisable. n The Deolaration added that 
"it is understood that the Governments of the Amerioan Republios 
will aot independently in their individual oapaoity, reoognizing 
fully their juridioal equality as sovereign states," and pro-
vided "that in order to faoilitate the oonsultation • • • • the 
'" Ministers for Foreign Affairs • • • • when deemed advisable and 
at the initiative of anyone of them, will meet in their several 
1 
oapitals by rotation and without protooolary oharaoter." 
The Lima Deolaration hardly did more than reiterate, 
amplify, and make somewhat more explioit the deolaration made 
at Buenos Aires in 1936, in whioh the ..Amerioan states had af-
firmed that ,fevery aot susoeptible to disturbing the feaoe of 
lFinal ~J Text of Deolaration, p. 131. 
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America affects each and everyone of them, and justifies 
the initiation of the procedure of consultation." Whether 
the Lima measure greatly strengthened the ftcontinentalizationtt 
of the Monroe Doctrine is hard to say. Lima did hint at a 
common action against subversive activities as well as open 
armed attack; and, most important of all, it prescribed a 
method for implementation through the clause providing for 
consultation to be carried out through meetings of the 
1 
Foreign Ministers. But beyond this there was nothing. 
Nevertheless, the Declaration of Solidarity must be 
2 
entered on the credit side of the ledger; what were the 
debits, the disappointments of the Conference? 
Disappointment I: Frojects for the creation of an 
~sociation of ~erican Nations, presented by Colombia and 
the Dominican Republic, which had been referred to Lima by 
l~ resolution, No. CVIl, on Improvement in the ~ro­
cedure of Oonsultation provided that consultation might be 
invoked for economic, cultural, and other q,uestions. Final 
Act, p. 131. 
2There were, of course, other manifestations of co-
operation at Lima important enough to merit attention. They 
included, in the field of economiCS, resolutions on the re-
duction of barriers to international trade, No. II, ibid., 
p. 20, and on the liberalization of inter-American commerce 
and economic non-aggression, No. LXIII, ibid., p. 91; a 
sweeping reiteration of American prinCiples, No. CX, ibid., 
po 133, and a specific re-statement of non-recognition-of 
acq,uisition of territory by force, No. ~~, ibid., p. 54. 
More important were resolutions directed against racial 
or religious persecution, No. XXXVI, ibid., p. 62, and 
ideological penetration, No. XXVII, ~., p. 55, and 
no. lG.7III, ibid., po 56. In addition, there were the 
usual slow steps made toward a codification of international 
law, mainly in Resolution XVII, ~., p. 42. 
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Buenos ~res, were again evaded. These important measures 
were referred to a conference of jurists with the suggestion 
1 
that they be submitted to the Ninth Conference. 
Disappointment II~ The Mexican project of the Peace 
Code, modified by the Committee of Experts to which it had 
been referred, and a proposal from the United States for the 
consolidation of American peace agreements were both referred 
to the Fan American Union and International Conference of 
2 
American Jurists for consideration at the Ninth Conference. 
Disappointment III: Consideration of the project 
to establish an Inter-American Court of Justice, which had 
been referred from Convention to Convention from almost the 
very first, was again postponed, with the declaration "that 
..., 
it is the firm purpose of the states of the ~erican conti-
ment to establish an Inter-4merican Court of International 
Justice, whenever these states may recognize the possibility 
3 
fI of doing so with complete assurance of success • • • • 
Disappointment IV: The entire problem of the defini-
tion of an aggressor and the application of sanctions was 
referred to a later date. 
4 
1 Ibid. , Resolution XIV, p. 37. 
2 Ibid. , Resolution rf, p. 38. 
3Ibid., Resolution £XV, p. 52. 
4Ibid. , Resolution .£.XIV, p. 51. 
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Disappointment V= & draft project pledging the 
.American states not to employ armed force for the collec-
tion of public or contractual debts and not to intervene 
diplomatically in support of pecuniary claims (unless there 
was a denial of justice or an infraction of international 
law) was debated inconclusively. In addition to this draft, 
Mexico and Argentina presented other projeots touohing on 
the question of pecuniary olaims. Rather than press the 
projeots whioh had already started a heated debate, the 
Conferenoe reoommended the problem for future study and 
1 
oonsideration at the next Conferenoe. 
Disappointment VI: In the eoonomio field, the best 
the Conference oould produoe were the usual reoommendations 
for reduotion of trade barriers and liberalization of inter-
2 
American commerce. 
Disappointment VII: irobably the biggest failure of 
all at Lima, according to John W. »bite of the New York Times 
who seems to have been the only journalist exeroising critical 
judgment there, was the failure of the United States to as-
sume an aggressive leadership of the bloo standing for strong 
cooperation. Not only did the United States sidestep this 
leadership, but, in inSisting upon unanimity at all oosts, 
lCf. Charles A. Thomson, ~Results of the ~ima Conference,~ 
Foreign ;Policy Reports, 1.'V, no. 1 ~Maroh 15, 1939), 7-8. ~ 
2 
Final ~, Resolution II, p. 20; Final ~, Resolution 
LXIII, p. 91. 
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it did not allow another country to take the requisite 
1 
measures. The criticism seems to be justified in the re-
sults of the Conference; nor did the Caribbean bloc accept 
the results with e quan1mity. 
Correspondent White stated that the Cubans were bitter 
because the delegation of the United States had backtracked 
on its promise to support Cuba's strong resolution calling 
for the repudiation of all collective persecution r'for racial 
and religious motives. d Thisclearcut opportunity to align 
'"' the American states against the new rise of anti-Semitism in 
German-controlled regions was opposed by ~rgentina and the 
other countries economically bound to Germany. The softening 
of the Declaration to a statement that persecution "is con-
trary to the political and juridi cal systems of America ft was 
acceded to readily by the United States and was regarded as an 
act of betrayal by Cuba and the other Caribbean states. 
Other criticisms of the leadership a t the Conference 
were fundamental. Mexican and Cuban delegates openly mourned 
a muzzling of free debate; the steering committee was censured 
for refusing to let the Conference receive Cuba's proposal 
that the American nations offer mediation in the Spanish Civil 
2 
War; ff one prominent Central ..american delegate,tt on reading the 
lNew ~ Times, December 21, 1938, p. 12. 
2 Many observers were pointing out that a Rebel victory 
in Spain would provide an opportunity for greater Fascist pene~ 
tration in South £merica. Spain's close cultural ties with 
South America were particularly teared. 
final draft of the solidarity deolaration. was quoted as 
saying: 
We are going home to restudy our whole position 
with regard to future ian ..unerioan Conferenoes. If 
this is an example of what they are to be, they are 
a waste of time and not worth the expense of send-
ing delegates to them. l 
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The oonstantly oompromising position of the United 
States was made more marked by the open Nazi efforts to 
sabotage the Conferenoe. As early as Deoember 6, a oorre-
spondent wrote, -It would be foolish to pretend that the 
... 
Rome-Berlin ~is is not exerting strong influenoe in the 
forthooming oonferenoe. d John \Vhite reoorded that the 
... 
tt,a.gents of the Rome-Berlin .ais have begun a determined 
fight to prevent formation at Lima of a £en Amerioan AXis 
that ~ght strengthen the United States at Germany and Italy's 
expense in South Amerioa." White gave as an example of German 
methodology an advertised leoture on aroheological research in 
Peru by Professor A. Ubbelolide-Doering of Munioh; instead of 
a disoussion of the re oent digging in Peru, "his audienoe heard 
a soathing attack on ian Americanism and ~resident Roosevelt's 
2 
'bugbear' of a German invasion of South Amerioa." At the 
Conferenoe, itself, a disproportionate number of both German 
and Italian "observers" were on hand. 
IJohn W. ~Yhite in the ~ York Times, Deoember 21, 1938, 
p. 12. 
2 Ibid., December 6, 1938, p. 1. 
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Flaoed in a defensive position, the United States 
achieved neither the more desirable result nor the more re-
speoted position that might have been gained through an ag-
gressive attack on the attacker. On the other hand, it oan-
not be doubted that the tactics pursued by the United States 
were in great part responsible for whatever the Conference 
finally did achieve. In contrast to ~unich, Lima stood not 
for coercion but for voluntary agreement. 
In this field, Lima conserved the gains made at 
Montevideo and Buenos Aireso It took no backward stepso 
~t a time when general retreat characterized the forces 
of peaceful cooperation, and international understanding, 
it held ground previously won ind kept the road open for 
further advance in ~!e future. 
The achievements at ~ima -- specifically; (I) the amplification 
of the continental Monroe Doctrine through the Solidarity ~ree­
ments; (2) the measures advocating the principle of free trade; 
and (3) the gentle criticism of German racial persecutions 
these steps, such as they were, represented defeat for the at~ 
ten~ts of the Fascist nations to scuttle the Lima Conference. 
But German propaganda did not prevent more significant 
achievements. ~ore fundamental reasons for the failure were 
suggested by the following conversation between :.t'rofessor 
Samuel Guy Inman of the United ~tates and Foreign ~fairs 
~inister Oantilo ofAXgentina; 
lOf. Charles ~. Thomson, nResults of the Lima Conference,d 








But you and y~. Hull did differ, then? In 
What way? 
We differ in this, Mr. Hull seems to get 
his key from what is outside this continent. 
He expressed his fear of what Europe or .sia, 
with their new ideologies might do to America, 
so he wants us to arm. I get my key from 
America itself. I say our busi ness is to go 
forward in building our American life in the 
aerican spirit. ·When a nation from the out-
side really threatens us, then is the time 
we are to take decisive and united action to 
defend ourselves. 
Doesn't it seem to you, Dr. Cantilo, that 
Chancellor Hitler might be starting off on 
a second Napoleonic era? 
No, I do not at present see that. What I 
do think is that America ought to stand 
solidly together for its own development. 
Our program ought to be drawn not because 
we fear an outside enemy, but because we 
want to make a strong .America. The position 
of the United States is different from that 
of Latin ~erican countries. You must face 
certain wor Id pro bleme wh ich are not ours. 
The United States worked out its problem 
with China, its strong pOSition in the rhilip-
pines and Hawaii, not from an inter-America stand-
point, but based on your own national interests. 
So today you naturally work out your world re-
lations according to your own ideas. But then 
the United States brings that position here to 
us in Latin 4merica and says, "Let us adopt 
this as a ran American policy."~ We do not 
like this. ~ 
Mister ~inister, why is it that Argentina always 
seems to be so near to Europe? 
¥.-ell, in the first place, in Ju'gentina our popu-
lation contains an enormous number of Italians, 
Spanish, French, Germans, and other European 
people. Equally import~t is that Europe is 
our market and we sell it most of our products. 
The United States buys practically nothing 
from us. Did you know th at in the l' 1r st e igh t 
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months of 1938 Argentina bought more from the 
United States then we did from England, our 
best customers? And what did the United St~tes 
buy from us? How can we expect to forget all 
about the people who give lifeblood to our 
nation and buy our products? 
ISarnuel Guy Inman, "Lima Conference and the Totali-
tarian Issue,ft ~ Jnnals 2! ~ £merican Academy ~ Fo1itica1 
and Social Sc~ence, CCIV (July, 1939), 10. This issue of The 
Innais contains a supplement on "The Lima Conference and t~ 
Future of Fan 4mericanism. ft ~ 
CHAPTER V 
PANAMA, 1939 - HAVANA, 1940 
CHJl'TER V 
F~AMA, 1939 - HAVANA, 1940 
September, 1939, marked the beginning of the war 
in Europe and the beginning of a new phase in Fan ~erican 
relations. The speed with which the first Consultative 
Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American 
Republics was convened at Panama demonstrated the concern of 
1 
the American states over the European war. The primary con-
cern of the meeting, which started on September 23, waS in 
maintaining the collective neutrality of the states of the 
two Americas and in minimizing the economic effects of the 
2 
war on the hemisphere. Iorior to the gathering, there were 
the usual German attempts to create dissenSion, John \.hite 
reporting from Buenos Aires that "German propaganda agencies 
are flooding Latin America with warnings that the neutrality 
conference at Fanama is merely a guise for trapping the 
lThe Conference was jointly initiated by the govern-
ments of ~gentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, ranama, 
Feru, and the United states. These countries agreed on 
:Panama as a meeting place, and invitations were issued by the 
Secretary of Foreign ~fairs of that nation. Text of invita-
tion is in The Conferences of American States, ppo 315-316. 
Cf. also Re~t ~ the Delegates of the UnIted States £! 
Amerioa ~he Meet'Iiii .£!. ~ ForeTgii"1:rinIsters E!.. ~ Juneri~ 
oan Republios (Washington:--U. S. Government Printing Office, 
'ffio ), p. 30 
2Just three days before the meeting oonvened, President 
Roosevelt declared that his policy for the United States was 
motivated by rtone single, hard-headed thought -- keeping 
America out of war.d ~ 12!! Times, September 21, 1939, p. 1. 
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South ~erican Republics into becoming protectorates of the 
1 
United States.1f 
One of the few open references to d ictatorshi..? in 
America ever made at the ~an ~erican meetings came with the 
inaugural speech of }resident Juan Demostenes ~osemena of 
Fanama, who attempted to dissooiate the Americas from totali-
tarianism, explaining that the numerous South American dic-
tatorships were "patriarchal manifestations springing from 
2 
the inability of certain classes to govern themselves. II 
Significant legislation to insure the collective 
neutrality of the American states was promulgated at the 
meeting. Measures included: 
1. A general declaration, whioh "reaffirmed the 
status of general neutrality of the .American republios." 
The states were left free "to regulate in their individual 
and sovereign capacities the manner in which they were to 
give it specific application"; but oollectively they re-
solved to Ifhave their rights and status as neutrals fully 
1 Ibid., September 24, 1939, p. 42. 
2 Ibid., p. 1. Only three plenary sessions of the 
meeting were-made public. Brief minutes of the other general 
sessions were made, but no record of the committee proceedings 
was kept. Cf. Re?ort ~ ~ Meeting of ~ ~inisters of 
Forei~ ~fairs 0 lh! Amer~can Republics, submitted to the 
Govern ng Board of the Fan American Union by the Director 
General, "Congress and Conference Series·t (vJashington: :E'an 
American Union, 1939), No. 29, p. 3. ~ 
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respeoted and observed." The JUnerioan nations deolared oertain 
standards existent whioh they would uphold in their status as 
neutrals. To this end, they agreed, among other things, to 
prevent their respective territories -- land, sea, or air --
from being used as bases for belligerent operations; and to 
prevent in their territories the enlistment of persons to 
serve in the armed foroes of a belligerent, the setting forth 
of military expeditions in the interest of a belligerent, 
or the fitting out and arming of vessels for belligerents. 
The deolaration further asserted that the American nations 
would maintain close oontaot in order to bring into uniformity, 
so far as possible, the measures they adopted for the enforoe-
1 
ment of their neutral rights. 
2. The Declaration of Panama, which set forth the 
highly publicized, but now forgotten, neutrality zone. This 
lr'General Deolaration of Neutrality of the .&merican 
Republics,· Resolution V, printed in International Conferences 
of ~ericaR States, p. 326. l~e Declaration also set up an 
lnter-American Neutrality Committee of seven experts to study 
and to formulate neutrality measures. Further resolutions 
dealing with the attitude of this hemisphere toward the war 
were on Coordination of £olioe and Judicial ~easures for the 
Maintenance of Neutrality, No. VIII, ibid., pp. 331-332, 
whioh provided for the formulation of-common rules of action 
"of the polioe and judioial authorities •••• in preventing 
or repressing unlawful activities that individuals, whether 
they be nationals or aliens, may attempt in favor of a foreign 
belligerent state"; on Contraband of War, No. VII, ibid., 
p. 330, whioh registered oPPosition to the placing of foodstuffs 
and clothing for civilian populations on the lists of contra-
bands; and on the Humanization of viar, No. VI, ibid., p. 329. 
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interesting document stated that nthe nature of the present 
conflagration • • 0 • would not justify any obstructions to 
inter-American communications which, engendered by important 
interests, call for adequate protection." In view of til is 
fact, theA.merican republics declared, as a measure of conti-
nental self-protection, that so long as they maintained their 
neutrality, they "are as of inherent right entitled to hu.ve 
those ',tvaters adjacent to the american continent, which they 
regard as of primary concern and direct utility in their re-
lations, free from the cOIDnlission of any hostile act by any 
non-~erican belligerent nation, vmether such hostile act be 
1 
attempted or made from land, sea or air. lt The neutrality 
zone set forth roughly followed the contours of both 4mericas 
at a distance of about three hundred miles from shore. The 
declaration excluded the territorial waters of Canada and of 
the colonies and possessions of European countries in the 
hemisphere; this was legal fiction, however, it being a physi-
cal impossibility to separate these waters from those of the 
£merican nations. 
Shortly after the Fanama meeting it became apparent 
that the United States was not interested in maintaining strict 
neutrality; conse~uently, these declarations were of but transi-
ent interest. The more permanent contributions of the ranama 
Conference, therefore, fell in the field of economics. 
lIbido, pp. 334-337. 
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The resolution on economic cooperation repeated the 
time-worn shibboleth recommending that the governments do 
everything possible to abolish obstacles to free inter-~eri-
can trade. But it went further and, for the first time, cre-
ated an organization -- the J.merican Financial and Econo.mic 
.dvisory Committee, consisting of twenty-one experts, one 
from each of the American republics. Functions of this com-
mittee were widespread; its specific duties were to consider 
problems of monetary relationships and foreign exchange; 
effective measures for mutual cooperation to mitigate dis-
locations of foreign trade affected by the war; and the 
1 
possibility of establishing customs truces. 
In addition to the neutrality and economic measures 
taken at Fanama, a series of other resolutions, most of which 
were aimed at the maintenance of peaceful relations among the 
~erican nations, was also promulgated. They included. 
(a) a reaffirmation of the Lima Declaration of Continental 
2 
Solidarity; (b) an assertion of the faith of ~erican nations 
lIbid., Resolution III, pp. 322-326. The resolution also 
recommendea-that the governments do everything possible to 
abolish obstacles to the free inter-,Americs.n movement of capital, 
and the negotiation of agreements to facilitate inter-American 
credit, to attempt to prevent excessive increase in the price of 
manufactured articles. In addition, it urged that the govern-
ments make every effort to complete their respective sections 
of the ran msrican Highway. 
2 
~., Resolution IV, p. 326. 
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in the maintenanoe of international aotivities in aocordanoe 
with Christian morality;l (0) a reoommendation to the 4Uneri-
oan states to eradicate the spread of subversive ideologies 
2 
to proteot the "oommon inter-..A!Ilerioan democratio ideal"; 
and (d) a provision to hold another meeting of Foreign 
3 
~inisters, with an additional proviso for an immediate meet-
ing in the case of a transfer of sovereignty of geographio 
4 
regions of the ~erioas held by non-American states. 
By the time the seoond ~eeting of Foreign ~inisters 
was held in Havana, from July 21 to July 30, 1940, interest 
and emphasis had shifted away from neutrality to problems of 
hemispherio defense. The German viotory in France, the taking 
of Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries, and the threatened 
invasion of Great Britain had brought the war oons jd erably 
closer to America; politically closer because Danish, Dutch, 
and Frenoh possessions in this hemisphere were no longer con-
trolled by "friendly democracies"; economically closer, becaus e 
the expansion of the war had created a crisis in Latin ~erioan 
exports. In addition, fear was rampant that the alarming 
llli£. , Resolution IX, p. 332. 
2~., Resolution XI, p. 333. 
3 
~.J Resolution XII, p. 334. 
4Ibid. , Resolution XVI, p. 338. 
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extension of Nazi activities indicated that Germany would seek 
economic or political domination on this continent, once vic-
1 
torious in Europe. 
In the month preceding the meeting, the Uni ted States 
took several steps that were indicative ot the coming CJ urse 
2 
of action at Havana: 
1. On June 17, Secretary Hull instructed the foreign 
offices at Berlin and Rome to inform Germany and Italy that 
"the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would 
lot. ~. R. Elliott, r'J£uropean Colonies in the Western 
~emisphere,M Forei~n FOliCn Reports (~ugust 15, 1940), and ~oward J. T~uebl~o , -The avana Conference of ~940,M Foreign 
l;-olicy Reports (i;jeptember 15, 1940). Totali tar lan pl:essure 
on the American states and totalitarian activity within these 
states was stronger before the Havana meeting than ever be-
fore. On the eve of the Conference, Dr. otto Reinebeck, 
German Minister to zanama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and E1 Salvador, delivered notes to all these 
countries, except Fanama, warning them that the Conference 
would move them away from neutrality and that Germany would 
retaliate, should the delegates act against that country. 
Time (July 22, 1940), p. 14. (Secretary Hull subseQuently 
liIrback at this "intimidation" with vigor.) .... dispatch in 
the New York Times from Berlin~onJuly 12 (p. 6) said that 
Goering t s newspaper, the Essener 1~e.ziona1 Zei tuna' warned 
the South American nations against aliowIng thenited ~tates 
to impose a monopoly over their exports and thereby jeopardize 
their post-war trade. On July 16, dispatches i~ the ~ ~ork 
Times (p. 12) told of the Nazis spending from flfty to a un-
dred thousand dollars a month for propaganda activities in 
Chile and of the putting down of a Nazi putsch in that country. 
~t the Conference, itself, Germany had three active propagan-
dist observers, Dr. Reinebeck, Stepman Tauchnitz, Charge d'~­
feires at Havana, and George Leisewitz, secretary of the German 
Legation at Santiago. 
2"'dapted from Howard J. Trueblood, "The Havana Conference 
of 1940," Foreign Folicy Reports (September~15, 1940), pp. 2-3. 
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not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic 
region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-~erican power 
to another non-Amer ican power. If Subsequently, the French, 
British, and Dutch governments were similarly notified. 
2. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed resolutions 
containing similar "hands off" warnings and stating that the 
"" United States would consult immediately with the other ~eri-
can states in regard to measures necessary to protect their 
1 
interests. 
3. The Washington administration announced it was 
contemplating a vastly enlarged program of Latin ~erican 
economic cooperation; on June 22, ~resident Roosevelt an-
nounced a cartel plan providing for "an effective system of 
joint marketing of the impartant staple exports of the .meri-
2 
can republics." 
4. Almost simultaneously, Edwin C. Wilson, United 
States ~inister to Uruguay, made an authorized announcement 
that "it is the intention and avowed policy of my Government 
~ 
to cooperate fully, whenever such cooperation is desired, with 
all the other American governments in crushing all activities 
which arise from non-American sources and which imperil our 
poli tical and economic freedom. I' The United States pointedly 
chose to have this armouncement made in a sll.l.all, far-away, 
1 Cf. New York Times, June 18, 19, 1940, p. 1. 
2Ibid ., June 24, 1940, p. 1. 
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and poorly armed country which had just been shaken by the 
discovery of a Nazi plot to seize control of its government. 
These four measures converged into the focal point 
of interest at the Havana hleeting; the main purpose of the 
United States at the meeting was to aChieve backing and co-
operation from the other ~erican states for its armounced 
policy in regard to European possessions in this hemisphere. 
In his address before the Conference on July 22, Hull stated 
that the United States was in favor of "the ests.blishment of 
a collective trusteeship, to be exercised in the name of all 
the J.merican republics," for European territory in4merica 
threatened by a change of o~nership. The Secretary of State 
denied that the trusteeship would carry with it any thought 
of the creation of a special interest by any American re-
public and suggested that "as soon as conditions permit, the 
region should be restored to its original sovereign or be 
declared independent when able to e sts.blish and maintain stable 
1 
self-government." 
As usual, Argentina supplied the main, and in this 
case, about the only opposition to the plan of the United 
States. Divergence was not fundamental, the chief point at 
issue being the urgency of the question. Argentina, through 
its delegate, Dr. Leopoldo ~elo, argued that there was no need 
for haste since the danger of the transfer of sovereignty that 
lText of the address in U. S. Department of State, 
Bulletin, July 27, 1940. 
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the United States feared was j'purely hypothetical"; that so 
long as the British fleet ~~s intact and the Germans remained 
1 
prisoners of the continent, no danger existed. 'l'he Argen-
tines also contended that, under the circumstances, the act 
of assuming administration over a given ~uropean colony might 
be tantamount to an act of vvar, which only the £rgentine Con-
gress could declare. 
But Argentina, this time, stood alone against an al-
most solid phalanx of the other twenty countries, led by the 
United States. A deadlock threatened for the first four days 
of the nine-day meeting, but the result was inevitable; a com-
promise was effected, with 4Xgentina giving most of the ground. 
Virtually the sole concession made to the southern recalcitrant 
was the use of the phrase "provisional administration" instead 
of Ifmandate" or "joint protectorate. f' 
The Convention on the Frovisional ~dministration of 
European Oolonies and ¥ossessions in the Americas and the ~ct 
of Havana, which supplemented the more formal treaty, were 
final steps in the "con tinentalization lt of the .. v..onroe Doctrine. 
The 16.ct of Havana, itself, was a temporary measure to cope 
with the problem of the European possessions until the con-
vention could be approved by the various governments. The 
act first states that I'the status of regions on this continent 
lOf. "Twenty nations and One," Fortune, XXII, .i.'W. :3 
(September, 1940), ? 4. 
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belonging to European powers is a subject of deep concern 
to all of the Governments of the .&merican Republics.· t The 
American countries recognized that tlas a result of the present 
European war there may be attempts at conquest •• • • thus 
placing in danger the essenoe and pattern of the institutions 
of Ameri ca. ff The aot deolared "that when islands or regi ons 
in the iiJUericas now under the possession of non-a.merican 
n~tions are in danger of becoming the subject of barter of 
territory or change of soverej.gnty, the ~erican nations, 
taking into account the illlperative need of oontinental se-
curity and the desires of the inhabitants of the said islanas 
or regions, may set up a regime of provisional auministration 
" ~nong the conditions of the administration WaS the • • • • 
stipulation tfthat as soon as the reasons reCiuiring this me9.sure 
shall cease to exist," the possessions would either be made 
~ 
independent, I'if it shall appear that they are 8ble to con-
stitute and maintain themselves in such condition, or be re-
stored to their pr8vious st9.tus, whichever of these alter-
natives shall appear the more practicable and just." Llore-
over, "this adm inlstration shall be exercised with the two-
fold purpose of c ontribut ing to the se curl ty and defense of 
the Continent, and to the economic, political and social 
progress of such regions • • • • It 
~rovided in the act was the creation of an emergency 
committee, subject to call at the request of any Signatory, 
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whose duty should be the assumption of the administration of 
a region attacked or threatened "if it beoomes necessary as 
an imperative emergency measure before the coming into ef~ 
fect of the convention approved by this Oonsultative keeting 
" ~ significant proviso of the Act of Havana states • • • • 
that I'should the need for emergency action be so urgent that 
action by the co~nittee cannot be awaited, any of the ~erican 
Republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the 
right to act in the manner which its own defense or that of the 
1 
continent requires. If 
The oonvention, signed by the delegates on July 19, 
was essentially an amplification of the principles laid down 
by the Act of Havana; the oonvention provided detailed legal 
machinery for the possible administration of ~uropean possessions. 
In many ways, it was even stronger than the teillporary act. It 
stated, for example, that "no transfer or attempt to transfer 
or aoquire any interest or right in any such region (territories 
of non-~erican countries located in this hemisphere), directly 
or indirectly, would be reoognized or accepted by the American 
RePublics, no matter what form was employed to attain such 
purposes." The oonven tion specif ically exelnpted from its 
provisions "territories or possessions which are the subject 
lText in The International Conferences of 4ll.er'icbn 
~tates, pp. 364-5:-- --
72 
of dispute or claims between European povvers and one or more 
1 
of the republics of the ..iwnericas. n 
In addition to the problem of the European colonies, 
further considerations of neutrality and foreign activities, and 
of economic and financial cooperation C9.me before the Conference. 
The Committee on Neutrality was deluged with projects designed 
to protect the Western Hemisphere from Fifth Column activities. 
The most important of these, on the suppression of activities 
directed from abroad against domestic insti tutions, was sub-
2 
mitted by the United states. vv i th Uruguay, the United State s 
presented projects designed to prevent political activities 
3 
on the part of consular and diplomatic agents, viliile ~gentina 
advanced a plan for the coordination of police and judicial 
4 
measures o ~long the same line, Cuba proposed precautionary 
5 
measures with ref.erence to the issuance of passports. .ill 
these measures were approved by the Conference. .uso approved 
IChief regions of this category are British Honduras 
and the Falkland Islands, long in dispute between Guatemala 
and Argentine and Great Britain. Text of the Convention in 
ibid., pp. 373-377. Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and Vene-
zuela signed with reservations. 
2 Ibid., Resolution VI, pp. 351-352. 
3Ibid., Resolution II, p. 3510 
4Ibid., Resolution III. 
5Ibid., Resolution V, p. 353. 
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were a resolution condemning hostilities within the territorial 
1 
waters as def ined at the :C'anama Meeting and the usual recom-
2 
mendation for the promotion of continental solidarity. 
long series of recommendations from the Inter-£merican Neutral-
ity Committee, with a number of projects submitted by the 
various countries, were referred back to the Committee, with 
3 
a vote of applause and congratulations for its previous work. 
More important than these measures were the steps 
taken in the field of economic cooperation. There was no men-
tion made at Havana of t he cartel plan which had been promi-
nently discussed prior to the Conference; this gigantic market-
ing project had run up against many difficulties as ~Bll as a 
lack of enthusiasm from the other ~erican states. On the 
day that Secretary Hull made his economic recommendations at 
Havana, iresident Roosevelt announced his substitute for the 
cartel, a request that Congress "give prompt consideration to 
increasing the capital and lending power of the Export-Import 
Bank of Washington by i500,OOO,OOO, and removing some of the 
restrictions on its operations to the end that the bank may 
be of greater existence to our neighbors south of the Rio Grande, 
including finanCing, the handling and marketing of some part 
lIbid., Resolution XIII, p. 359. 
2Ibid ., Resolution XII, p. 358. 
3Ibid., Resolution It p. 349. 
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1 
of their surpluses.~ 
The Havana resolution on economics substantially 
represented Hull's recommendations. It included a declara-
tion that the American nations should "continue to adhere 
to the li beral principles of international trade, It be willing 
to conduct trade with any non-American country in accordance 
with these free principles, and "do everything in their 
power to strengthen their own economio position." The 4m.eri-
can states further pledged 'fto improve further the trade and 
other economio rela tions between and among themselves; and 
to devise and apply appropriate means of effective action to 
cope with the difficulties, disadVantages and dangers arising 
from the present disturbed and dislocated world conditions." 
The delegates voted to provide for the strengthening and ex-
pansion of the activities of the Inter-American Financial and 
Economic Advisory Committee and instructed this committee to 
proceed with the promotion of a long list of cooperative ac-
tivities. Among the most important duties given the committee 
was the creation of instruments to facilitate the disposition 
of American surplus commodities and to develop commodity ar-:-
rangements with a view to assuring equitable terms for both 
2 
producers and consumers of the commodities concerned. 
lU. S. Department of State, Bulletin, July 27, 1940, p. 41. 
2The International Conferences of 4merican 5tates, 
Resolution-IXv, pp. 368-370. 
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The two meetings of foreign ministers demonstrated, 
first of all, the efficacy of the consultative procedures 
set up by the American nations at their preceding conferences. 
That the first meeting could be held less than a month after 
the outbreak of war was testimony to the fact that the previous 
inter-American conferences were productive of a genuinely co-
operative attitude. But neither meeting accomplished what 
reasonably might have been expected of it. 
As the result of an extremely short-sighted policy on 
the part of the United States, the political measures taken at 
I'anama were soon forgotten. When it became apparent that the 
neutrality zone, for example, ~nuld work more hardships an 
Great Britain than on Germany, the United States lost all in-
1 
terest in enforcing it; since the other ~erican states 
possessed no power to enforce the zone, if they did have the 
inclination, the neutrality legislation soon became meaningless. 
This situation arose, of course, as the result of the policy 
of the United States, sponsoring a measure one month it had 
no desire to enforce the next. As a consequence, the other 
American nations were in an advantageous pOSition to criticize 
the bad faith of the United States. 
lVery interesting are the documents of the protest of 
the American republics and the replies of Germany and England 
on the Graf Spee incident. Cf. Bulletin 2! ~ ~ ~erican 
Union, 74 (May, 1940), 403-8. 
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The creation of the Inter-American ]'inancial and 
Economic Advisory Committee at :fanama was an important step 
for~ard; yet the committee, itself, accomplished little be-
tween consultations; as a matter of fact, the members of the 
1 
committee rarely attended their own meetings. In the face 
of these facts, the Havana meeting did no more than tender the 
commi ttee a vote of thanks and burden it with .many new functions. 
The major achievements at Havana were represented by 
the Act of Havana and the Convention on the .rrovisional .... d-
ministration of European Colonies. Through these measures, 
the ~!onroe Doctrine finally became a continental doctrine; 
'wi th them, the American nat ions set up effective machinery to 
act rapidly in the event any chBnge in the status of ~uropean 
colonies occurred or threatened to occur. Never before in the 
history of inter-American relations had measures for a common 
end been set forth more s traigh tforwardly. Here, too, however, 
the real test will come if and when the £merican states put 
these measures into action. 
The ultimate purpose of ~an Americanism in 1939 and 1940, 
considering the tenor of the times, should have been to weld the 
Aw.ericas into a solid military and economic bloc against totali-
tarianism. Against the European background, the measures of 
lef. Fortune, XXII, 1~0. 3 (September, 1940), 141. 
2 0f• supra, p. 74. 
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ranama and Havana appear inconclusive 4 In kr. null's own 
words, they are a "clearing of the decks." Yet they Viere 
the fullest expressions of the fan-.merican movement under 
emergency conditions and after more than fifty years of 
evolution. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 
The chief political danger to the Western Hemisphere 
rests in the economic threat of a Nazi-dominated Europe. 
This Europe would need vast supplies of food and raw materials 
from Latin America and could produce great quantities of fin-
ished goods for exchange. It also would probably have sup-
plies of armaments for sale oil terms attractive to South 
American countries with military ambitions. 
The United States normally takes only one-third of 
Latin America's total exports, while Europe consumes fram 
one-half to two-thirds of these products; consequently, 
Germany's bargaining powe'r would be stronger than that of the 
United States. And the head start would be lengthened further 
by an expansion of Germany's potent barter s.ystem. Thus, even 
if Central and South America were in thorough disagreement with 
the theory of Nazi politics and the practice of Nazi trade 
policy, which is a moot point, those countries could not de-
cline the opportunity to sell their great surpluses to Europe. 
Few of the Central American and none of the South American 
countries could, under current circumstances, reject German 




German domination in the lower Americas, whether 
political or economic, would be a threat to the supplies of 
the United States both in war and peace. In strategic mater-
ials, Latin American sources are of tremendous value to this 
country, even though many Latin American products essential 
to national defense are of minor significance in the region's 
total export values. The Army and Navy Munitions Board lists 
fourteen strategic materials "for which strict conservation 
and distribution control measures will be necessary." They 
are antimony, chromium, cocoanut shell char, ferro-grade 
manganese, manila fiber, mercury, mica, nickel, quartz crystal, 
quinine, rubber, silk, tin, and tungsten. The Central and 
South American states produce many of these in quantity for 
export to the United States, while others are available in 
2 
limited amounts and are ca~able of further production. 
Latin American sources are also needed for the peace-
time economy of the United States. The southern republics 
have almost a monopoly on bauxite, from which aluminum is made, 
lHoward J. Trueblood, "Economio Defense of the Amer-
icas," Foreign Policy ReEorts, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1~40), 
127. One of the most ex austive stUdies on inter-American 
economics is M. Ezekiel's "Economic Relations between the 
Americas," International Conciliation, No. 367 (February, 1941). 
2Howard J. Trueblood, "Economic Defense of the Amer-
icas," Foreign Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 
129. 
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and on bananas, Brazil nuts, oarnauba wax, oastor beans, ohiole, 
ooffee, flaxseed, and other important produots. In addition, 
the Southern republios supply large quantities of sisal and 
henequen, sugar, cacao, hides and skins, manganese, and wool. 
Under normal circumstance s , it would be difficult to shift 
these purchases to other parts of the world; under conditions 
1 
of war time, it would be virtually impossible. 
If the Ger.man competition for these products of the 
Southern Americas were merely the old-fashioned trade rivalry 
of the last century. the problem would be an eoonomio and not 
a political one. But totalitarian Germany has added new twists 
that enable the Nazis to out-trade even the trading Yankee; 
and Ger.many aocompanies her trade with oultural and political 
infiltration. The result is cause for worry on two scores. 
The secret of Ger.man trade success is simple and forth-
right despite the attempts of some commentators to make it seem 
oomplex and Maohiavellian. Purpose of Nazi trade has been pro-
duots, not profits; unencumbered by a profit and loss statement, 
Ger.many has been able to offer attraotive terms of trade to 
Pan American states; possessing bulging surpluses, warehoused by 
world-wide trade restrictions, these states have oarried on a 
thriving business with Germany. Having no plaoe else to dis-
pose of their goods, the South American states have traded on 
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German terms. These terms, usually, have been the well known 
barter deals under which the Pan American nations have accepted 
payment for their goods in ASKI marks which can be used only 
for the purchase of German goods. Under this system, which is 
backed in Germany by large, secret, and arbitrary export sub-
sidies, the Nazis made amazing economic gains in the Southern 
Americas before the war. In 1936, Germany's best year, the 
Nazis pushed the United States out of first place as an ex-
porter to Brazil and Chile and. supplanted Great Britain in 
second place (after the United States) in Colombia, Ecuador, 
1 
Peru, and Venezuela. 
A good deal of the talk concerning German economic ad-
vances in Central and South America that dwells on the danger 
to the United States is, from the evidence that can be gathered, 
somewhat fallacious. While there is no doubt that Germany has 
made tremendous strides forward, most of her ~ins in later years 
have been at the expense of the third economic rival, Great Bri-
tain. 
Thus, in 1929, the United States, Great Britain, and 
Germany, together with Japan, exported approximately $1,612,000,000 
worth of goods to Latin America, an amount equal to 59.5 per cent 
of total Latin American imports during that year. Of this total, 
lFortune, XXII, No.3 (September, 1940), 137. 
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the share of the United States was the lion's, 60.3 per cent, 
followed by Great Britain with 24.0 per cent, Germany with 
14.8 per cent, and Japan a very poor fourth with 0.9 per cent. 
After 1929, the share of the United States shrank steadily 
until the low point of 48.0 per cent was reached in 1933, while 
Britain, Germany, and Japan increased their proportions to 32.2, 
17.5, and 2.3 per cent, respectively. 
The years from 1933 to 1936 witnessed a new increase in 
Latin American purchasing power and the greatest expansion in 
Germany's slice of the melon; during this period, too, the four 
competing nations increased their share of the total import 
trade of Latin America fram 51.1 per cent to an estimated 59.3 
per cent. In this period of greatest German activity, the com-
petitive position of the United States showed a slight improve-
ment, her percentage of the total exports within the group 
rising fram 48 per cent to 49.6 per cent. The significant fact 
is that during this t!me Great Britain's share dropped from 
32.3 per cent to 23.1 per cent of the total, while Germany's 
portion jumped fram 14.8 per cent in 1929 and 17.4 per cent in 
1933 to 23.6 per cent in 1936. (Japan's increase in the three-
year period was from 2.3 per cent to 3.7 per cent.) Thus in 
the total Latin American trade, Britain, which before 1914 had 
held first place, was relegated to third place in 1936; Germany 
advanced at Britain's expense almost exclusively from 1933 to 
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1936, though, partly due to Germany's activities, the United 
1 
States bad not reached her preeminence of 1929. 
In reality -- and this is a much overlooked tact -- the 
problem of hemispheric economic solidarity is not a Pan American 
problem, but a South American one. Dependence on the United 
States as a market for Latin American exports decreases markedly 
2 
from north to south; the troubles lie in the south. 
The Caribbean countries as a whole sell such a large 
proportion of their exports to ~':the United States, over 45 per 
cent during 1938, for example, that this group falls naturally 
within the economic orbit of the United States. Seven of these 
countries, 1938, sold 60 per cent or more of their exports to 
the United States: Panama sold 89.2 per cent; Honduras, 86.5 
per cent; Cuba, 76 per cent; Guatemala, 69.4 per cent; Mexico, 
67.4 per cent; Nicaragua, 67.3 per cent; and El Salvador, 61.8 
per cent. In addition, Panama is almost completely dependent 
upon this country as a result of the influence of the Canal, 
while expenditures of American tourists are of large importance 
to Cuba, Guatemala, and Mexico. In these countries, the problem 
of economic solidarity is no problem at all. 
, 
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Of the remaining Caribbean countries, the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Costa Rica, and Colombia are only slightly 
less dependent upon the United States, since they sold ap-
proximately 44 per cent of their total exports to this country. 
In the entire Caribbean area, only one country, Venezuela, does 
not find her chief export market in the United States, only 
13.2 per cent of her exports coming to this country in 1938. 
But Venezuela is strongly tied to the United States by a large 
indirect trade through the West Indies and by North American 
control of its oil fields, which are its main economic asset. 
South American states present the headach~. This bloc 
of eight states accounted for 58 per cent of all Latin American 
exports in 1938. Brazil, of this group, is closest economically 
to the United States, the latter country absorbing slightly 
more than 33 per cent of the former's exports; Uruguay is economi-
cally most distant, the United States taking only 4 per cent of 
that country's exports. In between these extremes, the West 
Coast States -- Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru -- sold to 
the United States about 20 per cent of their total exports, 
While, on the East Coast, Paraguay and Argentina sent 12.2 per 
cent and 8.5 per cent, respectively, of their products north-
ward. 
Complicating factors in the situation are: (1) two of 
the three largest exporting countries -- Argentina and Chile .-
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lie within the economically distant group; and (2) to a very 
marked extent the South American surplus commodity problem con-
cerns these countries and Brazil, which does not actually lie 
within the economic orbit ot the United States. In 1938, the 
total exports ot these three states was valued at $908,400,000, 
ot which only $175,300,000 went to the United States, a balance 
of $751,100,000 sold elsewhere. While the last sum includes 
shipments to other Western Hemisphere markets, a large surplus 
of grains, meat, cotton, copper, and nitrates -- the out stand ing 
products in a long list of surpluses remained for disposal 
1 
outside the hemisphere. The essential problem tor economic 
solidarity of the hemisphere lie s in the disposition of the 
75 per cent ot Argentina's exports, the more than 50 per cent 
of Chile's exports, and the 50 per cent ot Brazil's exports that 
2 
normally go to Europe and to Asia. 
War in Europe provided both an opportunity and a problem 
to the United States in her program of cementing economic solidar-
ity. Opportunity arose as the result of sources ot supply being 
closed to the southern countries; the problem was the disposal 
of South American products that normally would have gpne to 
Europe. During the first six months of the war, the United 
Lrrueblood, "Economic Defense 0 f the Americas," Fore ign 
Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 129. 
2Cf • Hispanic-American Historical Review (November, 1940), 
p. 664. 
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States' imports trom Latin America were valued at $285,280,000, 
as compared with $215,273,000 in the same period of 1938-39. 
This increase of 32.5 per cent in six months meant an annual 
dollar rise of about $140,000,000. Sugar, wool, hides, skins, 
and copper contributed largely to the general expansion, and 
some minor products recorded large gains as well. There was, 
however, only a slight increase in the value of imports of 
some of the leading products of South America, such as coffee, 
cacao, bananas, meats, and petroleum. 
During the same six months period, exports tram the 
United States to Latin America rose to $359,664,000, as con-
trasted to $234,201,000 in the last comparable period. This 
represents a gain of 53.6 per cent or, annually, an increase 
of about $250,000,000 in what Latin America pays the United 
1 
States for goods. 
Thus the record of inter-American trade for the first 
six months of the war, albeit profitable, should be the cause 
of much legitimate concern. For North American traders were 
taking their profit, and at a pace that soon would exhaust the 
ability of the Latin American states to pay for United States 
goods. These first six months showed that the United States 
could readily supply Latin America's demand for products, 
1 
Trueblood, "Economic Defense of the !mer icas, n Foreign 
Policy Reports, XVI, No. 10 (August 1, 1940), 133. 
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usually obtained but not then available, from abroad. But the 
period also showed that the United States did not take the place 
of Latin America's lost customers. 
The development of hemispheric economic solidarity is 
twofold. On the one side, the problem for the United States is 
to fill the largest possible amount of import requirements from 
Latin Americaj.on the other side, the problem for Latin America 
is to find a market for surpluses which are not normally sold 
in this hemisphere, without entering into political dependence 
upon Europe. For the war period at least, Latin America is 
forced to trade with the United States on whatever terms she 
can get, but no ephemeral Pan American ideal will keep the states 
in the economic and strategic orbit of the United States after 
the war; they will stay only if it is to their own economic ad-
vantage. The Pan American states have little enthusiasm for 
making financial sacrifices for the Pan American unity which 
many think, with some justice, accrues benefit only to the 
northern republic; the southern countries look to the United 
States to make sacrifices herself. 
In the past seven years, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act has been the cornerstone of economic cooperation between the 
United States and other American nations. Reciprocal agreements 
are now in force with eleven of the twenty-one republics, al-
though, significantly, the great majority of these countries 
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are in the Caribbean area where dominion of the United States 
is assured in any case. Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile have 
not signed trade agreement pacts. There is little evidence 
to show that these agreements work to the advantage of the 
other countries. Exports of the United States to countries 
in Latin America with Which reciprocal agreements are in force 
have expanded more rapidly than exports to the rest of the 
world; but imports from these countries have mounted much more 
1 
slowly than the exports. 
At the Panama Conterence in 1939, under the pressure ot 
war, the American states, for the first tir:..e, did something con-
crete by multi-lateral agreement about their c ammon economic 
problems; they created the Inter-American Financial and Economic 
Advisory Committee. At Havana, this Committee was given further 
powers of an advisory nature; simultaneously, the United States 
took an impressive step, President Roosevelt asking Congress 
for $500,000,000 to enable the Export-Import Bank to underwrite 
surplus commodities and to strengthen internal economies ot 
Latin American countries. This step, which was subsequently 
approved by the Congress, had nothing to do with the grandiose 
cartel plan announced earlier. It did give the Latin American 
countries some assurance of financial support; but it was a 
lHoward J. Trueblood, "Progress ot Pan American Coopera-
tion,· Foreign Policy Reports, XV, No. 23 (February 15, 1940), 
297. 
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short-term, emergency measure. Essentially, these loans are 
handouts, buying good will that will evaporate the moment the 
dole is stopped. 
As yet, the United States has not settled down to the 
really ditficult task of working out a long range program tor 
the rehabilitation ot the economic structures ot the Latin Ameri-
can nations -- through, in great measure, increasing the normal 
circulation ot goods within the hemisphere; through increasing 
the purchasing power ot the Latin American nations by improving 
the living standard within them; through developing the Latin 
American industries; through revising their antiquated financial 
1 
structure. 
There is only one feasible solution to the question ot 
what to do about South America; that is, in the tirst place, to 
admit the lack of economic interdependence and the inetficacy 
ot either words or good intentions to do anything about them; 
and, secondly, to proceed with the difficult task of making the 
ultimate selt-interest ot all the American states coincide with 
that ot the United States. Such a task is well nigh an impossible 
one; even a hemisphere cannot be isolated fram the rest ot the 
world. The only hope is in pursuing a starkly realistic course. 
let. Fortune, XXII, No.3 (September, 1940), Ill. 
90 
The tirst step should be recognition that the realistic 
course is not, in this case, the protitable one. Even at the 
risk ot eliminating some marginal producers in the United States 
and at the cost ot angering some sectional interests, an immedi-
ate downward hauling ot United States tariffs would be a laudable 
first step. The use ot quotas and preferential taritfs, like 
those now given Cuban sugar, would do much to relieve the pres-
sure ot South and Central American surpluses. The United States 
market for agricultural and pastoral products has not been ex-
hausted by any means; the products have simply not been made 
available. They could be admitted without any great injury to 
domestic producers. 
The most important ot these products trom the viewpoint 
of continental relations is Argentine beef. If the United States 
would take from Argentina only two per cent of our total meat con-
sumption, it would provide a market for one-third of that coun-
try's meat exports and do much good in easing her ditficulties. 
What especially hurts in this case is what President Roosevelt, 
himself, has called an "obvious inequity" -- the quarantining 
of Argentine beef under the Smoot-Hawley taritf clause which 
bars all meat from countries intected with contagious cattle 
diseases. Although large areas ot Argentina are intected with 
the toot-and-mouth disease, Patagonia is not, and Argentina 
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has rightly and mightily resented a quarantine based on 
indefensible biological grounds. The Argentine rancher on 
the rolling pampas thinks he has good cause to continue to 
sneer at such sentimental abstraction as "hemisphere soli-
darity" in the face of the fact that the Senate has refused 
to ratify the Sanitary Convention, which would have rectified 
the error of the quarantine and allowed healthy Argentine 
1 
beef into the country. 
In the long run, the surest defense of the hemisphere 
lies in expanding the inter- and intra-American trade -- in 
speeding up the north and south circulation of goods. To do 
this, it is necessary, above all things, to raise the extremely 
low South American standard of living. The per capita national 
income of Chile, for example, is $77.00 as compared with $537 
in the United States and Chile is by no means the poorest 
of the Amerioan states. The job would reauire a gigantic 
capital inflow from the United States. In the faoe of de-
faulted debts and foreign expropriations, prospects of private 
oapital undertaking the job are not very good. Nevertheless, 
the task is not insurmountable; for the consummation of the 
solidarity ideal, it must be aooomplished. Money invested in 
Latin America tor developing a more diversified agriculture, 
thereby widening the economio base; for building new manufacturing 
1 
~., p. 113. 
92 
centers, thereby reducing dependence upon imports, for tmproving 
the deplorable transportation system, thereby increasing the 
circulation ot goods -- would lift the purchasing power of 
Latin America beyond its present level and give it a tendency 
1 
to sustain a stability of its own. 
Only two agencies are now functioning to stimulate enter-
prises of this sort -- the Inter-American Bank, which grew out 
of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, 
and the Export-Import Bank of the United States. The for.mer, 
however, is more or less defunct due to the fact that the Ameri-
can republics, with customary disregard of pledges, have not 
put up the capital they were supposed to; the American Bank 
remains the only institution geared to till the ~p. The bank 
has made loans to Brazil and Argentina, notably for internal 
improvements, on the principle of "helping the countries to 
help themselves." Yet much remains to be done in the field. 
Outstanding commercial possibility of them all is the iron are 
deposits in Brazil. Rubber, which is indigenous to the tropics 
ot South America, but which is now cultivated there in relative-
2 
ly small quantities, presents another tantalizing problem. 
In the face of the enor.mity at the economic task that 
clearly faces the United States, measures that have been taken 
lIbido 
2 Ibid., p. 115 -
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seem dwarfed and insignificant. Indeed, neither the Reciprocal 
Trade Acts nor the Export-Import Bank move even appreciably in 
the direction of permanent solution. Loans, in great part, are 
stop-gap measures; trade agreements tend to the advantage of 
the United States and do not appreciably increase the needed 
economic stability of the contracting countries. On the con-
trary, both these measures make the United States vulnerable 
to the charge that she is attempting to keep the Pan American 
1 
states in a stage of eoonOIi1ic dependenoe. Suoh critioism, 
however, implies a delib~rate sabotage of inter-American economic 
relations, which does not seem to exist; rather, the evidence 
indicates a lack of willingness to recognize and to overcome the 
obstacles that stand in the path of true economic solidarity. 
Continued paternalism is not the answer. Neither does 
the answer lie in fluent fancies dwelling upon the merits of 
free trade, which exists no place in the world and almost least 
of all where the United States is concerned. Nor does it lie 
in stentorian derogation of Nazi trade policies. The only dif-
ference between the barter ~stem of Germany and the tariff and 
loan policy of the United States is that the for.mer is a far 
more efficient type of subsidy. Only an immediate definition 
of objectives and a sober appraisal of the means for attaining 
1 
Cf. Beals, ~.~.J p. 266. 
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desired ends wUl solve the problem. What is appalling now is 
the lack ot coordinated ettort, the dependence on verbal solu-
tions and temporary measures, the insistence on protits when 
strategic considerations should be paramount. 
The problem ot the debts ot the Pan American states 
must be solved betore any real economic solidarity can be achieved. 
"A tactor ten t!mea as important as allY reciprocal trade agree-
I 
ment," the debts have not lieen considered a t any ot the meetings 
ot the American states. At Montevideo, Puig Casauranc ot Mexico 
pointed out the tundamental importance ot the debts time and 
time again. Betore the Committee ot Initiatives, December 4, 1933, 
Puig asked: "Could it be regarded inopportune, barren or foolish 
that at a meeting where twenty debtor countries are represented 
this theme ot so great importance should be looked into? 
The Mexican delegate~id that when bankers place loans 
" • • • • 
No care is given then to the need soon to rise torcing 
all kinds ot restrictions on international commerce in 
order that the debt obligations be fulfilled, and no im-
portance is attached to the condition devolving upon our 
peoples who are forced to live a miserable life, bearing 
with a tremendous depression • • • • the outflow of our 
insignificant metallic reserves in the service of these 
debts. And when we fail to observe our debt obligations 
religiously, the reasons that we have tor so acting are not 
looked into. We ar~ merely blamed tor not living up to our 
sacred commitments! 
1 Ie.!!., p. 268. 
2Quoted in ..!ill.., p. 269. 
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The Mexican delegate was making no attack on the United 
States for, he said, those who had wrought so much evil in 
America had also been "victims of their own absurd monetary and 
credit system." Despite this reasonable stand, his proposal to 
consider the matter was entirely smothered; nor was it again 
broached at the subsequent Lima meeting. 
Ignoring such fundamental considerations, the United 
States has shown bad planning in its attempts at constructive 
measures. The best example ot this lack of foresight was the 
announcement of the cartel plan in June, 1940, the complete 
dropping ot the plan in August of the same year. The plan was 
not dropped because of the criticisms of the Pan American states, 
who feared the control that would be exercised over their in-
ternal economies; the cartel was dropped because finanCing such 
a plan might mean a loss of from $150,000,000 to $300,000,000 
annually to the United States. That the potent ob.1 ections on 
either side were not anticipated is a sad commentary on the 
leadership of the Pan American policy of the United States. The 
fact that possible 108s to the United States was the paramount 
oonsideration in dropping the plan again demonstrates that 
economic oonsiderations still control the political ends this 
oountry is trying to achieve in the Americas. 
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During the imperialistic stage of this country's Pan 
American policy, the use of political means was most frequently 
directed at economic ends. By a strange quirk of history, the 
situation is now exactly reversed; the economic policy of the 
United States in Central and South America is primarily directed 
by political strategy and toward political ends. In the former 
days, the United States had not learned that it could not kill 
the goose and continue to collect golden eggs; today, the United 
States has not realized that good politics may mean bad business, 
that, in a word, political solidarity may have to be gained at 
the expense of business profits. At the beginning of the Roose-
velt administration, the Good Neighbor policy was synonymous 
with good (meaning profitable) business; in the foreseeable 
future, this symbiosis might reestablish itself. It is in the 
current intermediary stage of political emergency that the two 
factors become divergent. 
The attainment of political unity in the Americas is 
all-important; it is important during the war and will be im-
portant after the war, no matter who the victor. Achievement 
of this political end is worth almost any economic loss. The 
fallacy of the current policy of the United States lies in the 
fact that it is risking the same loss, through more loans to 
the southern nat ions, without attaining the permanent ends that 
the more fundamental economic measures could accomplish. 
CHAPTER VII 
FACTORS FOR AND AGAINST SOLIDARITY 
CHAPTER l'II 
FACTORS FOR AND AGAINST SOLTI>ARITY 
From the viewpoint of their own defense, the nations 
of Central and South America, individually, do not constitute 
either positive or potent forces; acting together, these nations 
have some power and a certain significance; in collaboration 
with the United States, they would command an invincible power. 
It is this truism that makes tbe success of the Pan American 
movement a challenge to the Americas. What forms have been. 
created and what forces are effective to implement the Pan 
American ideal? What factors are in play to discredit, or even 
to destroy, this ideal? 
Examination of documents adopted by the Oonferences of 
American states reveals certain doctrines, so frequently re-
affirmed that they must be recognized as tundamental to the 
American system. In truth, these doctrines are essential to 
any international cooperation dependent upon mutual good will 
and respect, and voluntary participation. Thus: 
1. The American states have repeatedly insisted that 
international relations must be conducted in accordance with the 
rules ot international law. They have recognized the necessity 
ot fostering the development ot that law, and they have embodied 
not a tew ot its recognized doctrines in treaties and conventions. 
They have given much attention to evolving suitable methods for 
codification and have created various agenoies for that purpose. 
2. The American states have constantly stood, in theory, 
for the settlement of international disputes by the pacific meth-
ods available in the law they have created. They have adopted 
numerous conventions and other instruments to foster the peace-
ful solution of their controversies and have made available such 
measures as diplomatic negotiations, good offices, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, consultation, investigation by com-
missions, and judicial settlement. In the Treaty on the Preven-
tion of Controversies, signed in 1938, they have set up a pro-
cedure for the prevention of international disputes through the 
elimination of the causes of future controversies. 
3. The American states have repeatedly repudiated the 
so-called rights of aggression and conquest. They have declared 
aggression an "international crime," have renounced the use ot 
force as an instrument ot policy, and have stated that they will 
not recognize the legal validity of acquisitions of territory 
through conquest or other non-pacific means. 
4. The American states have upheld the doctrine of non-
intervention, declaring that no nation possesses the right to 
intervene in either the internal or external aftairs of another 
states and have buttressed this declaration by further asserting 
that intervention, whether direct or indirect, is inadmissible 
on any grounds whatsoever. 
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5. The dootrine of the juridioal equality of states 
has, in later years, been repeatedly asserted. In the Amerioan 
system, all states, large or small, possess the same rights and 
an equal legal oapaoity, irrespeotive of power and wealth. 
6. The Amerioan states stand for the basio dootrine of 
the sanotity of international treaties and have insisted, at 
their meetings, that international engagements must be respeoted, 
1 
and revised only by the agreement of the oontraoting parties. 
In addition to these purely legal me.asures, the Amerioan 
states have taken further steps that, in the summing up, must be 
oounted as factors making for unity. 
7. On numerous occasions they have asserted their soli-
darity in adherenoe to republican governments and demooratic 
freedoms. 
8. The American states have enunoiated a polioy of mutual 
oonoern, affirming that a danger to one is a danger to all; that 
a threat to the security of one is a threat to the security of 
all. 
9. In a time of international orisis, the American states 
have demonstrated the effeotiveness of their oonsultative prooess 
by meeting promptly and aoting in unanimity. 
10. In an emergenoy that threatens their economio well-
being, they have made serious attempts to solve their problems 
lFirst six points adapted from prefatory note of George 
A. Finoh in The International Conferences of Amerioan States, 
pp. ix-xii. --- --
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by mutual action -- by the promotion ot a treer exchange ot 
goods through adherence to a liberal trade policy, and through 
other means ot colleotive planning and collective action. 
11. As a further emergency measure the states ot the 
Amerioas have taken, atter consultation, a common policy in 
regard to their neutrality and have adopted a oommon oourse ot 
action in the tace ot a common danger; namely, the oontingency 
ot an attempted transter ot American territory held by a non-
American state. 
12. Furthermore, the American nations have ooneerned 
themselves in innumerable ways with the promotion ot social well-
be ing and cultural under standing. 
13. Finally, there are potent ideologioal factors con-
duoive to strong Pan Americanism. As inhabitants of a cammon 
continent, which is somewhat detached geographically from the 
rest ot the world, there is a naturally strong feeling that 
common isolation calls for mutual cooperation, that in order 
to proteot themselves against aggression, the nations of America 
must be united by strong ties, and that, having once won their 
political liberty, they must adopt etfective methods to pre-
serve it. 
It action were suited to the word, there would be no 
problem ot Pan American solidarity. It assumptions on whioh 
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the words are predicated were true, there would be no hesitation 
in pronouncing inter-American solidarity a fact rather than sus-
pecting it a fancy. It is necessary to delve beneath the camou-
flage of words and to expose the fallacy of glib assumption. 
1. The greatest contrast exists between what the dele-
gates of the Pan American nations promise to do at their Con-
ferences, and what is actually done by the governments of those 
nations in the interims. Consider only the most important of 
the treaties and conventions' signed at the Conferences', those 
designed to maintain peace and to avert hostilities. (See chart, 
on page 102.) 
The very tirst ot these conventions was signed at the 
Fourth Congress in 1910 and concerned the settlement of pecuniary 
claims; as ot January 1, 1941, only eleven of the American states 
had ratified this convention. The important Protocol of Pro-
gressive Arbitration (Washington, 1929) has been ratitied by 
only nine states; the anti-war pact of Saavedra Lamas (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1933) has been ratified by nineteen states but is 
rather hopelessly encumbered by reservations of eight countries; 
the Additional Protocol to the Conciliation Convention ot 1929 
(Montevideo, 1933) has been ratified by only nine states; the 
Convention on the Prevention ot Controversies (Buenos Aires, 1936) 
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for the other treaties is somewhat better, the Gondra Treaty 
Santiago, 1923) having nineteen signatories. The Anti-War 
Treaty of Non-Aggression (Montevideo, 1933); the Convention 
on Good Offices and Mediation (Buenos Aires, 1935); the Treaty 
on Inter-American Arbitration (Washington, 1929); the Treaty 
on Inter-American Conciliation (Washington, 1929); and the 
Treaty for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment 
of Peace (Buenos Aires, 1935), all have fifteen or more rati-
1 
fications. 
2. The situation is complicated by the fact that the 
peace machinery of the important treaties is confused and over-
lapping and by the further tact that all efforts at simplifica-
tion and integration have been entirely unsuccessful. As things 
stand now, should conflict arise, there is a good chance that 
the disputing parties may not be signatories to the same treaties 
or conventions, and in the resulting confusion over which peace 
machinery is to be used, none will operate effectively. 
lFrancis Wilcox in his study, The Ratification of Inter-
national Conventions (London: Unwin Brothers, 1935), suggests 
that "largely because the Pan American Union has not been vigorous 
or consistent in its action to secure ratifications from member 
states, its conventions have not been widely accepted." p. 219. 
Though this factor undoubtedly plays its part, one is inclined 
to believe that truer causes for non-ratification are more 
fundamental: that (1) the American states do not consider the 
conventions important enough to merit putting them through rati-
fication procedures, and/or (2) the states do not find the con-
ventions consistent with national policies. 
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3. The same oonfusing situation exists for the problem 
of the oodifioation ot international law, with no less than five 
permanent oommittees at work in addition to a oommittee within 
1 
eaoh of the twenty-one nations. 
4. Though in reoent years the preoooupation with in-
terna1 matters by the Pan American states has made for a 1aok 
of important political controTersies among them, the Chaoo dis-
pute between Paraguay and Bolivia is an example par excellence 
of the disinolination ot these southern states to settle their 
important international disputes by means of the pacifio methods 
available in laws they have created. No two nations had greater 
opportunities to avail themselves of peaceful means, yet the de-
oision was made on the battlefield and to the victor in arms went 
the spoils. And with Latin Amerioa arming at a paoe unequalled 
ever before in its history, there is muoh oause for believing 
that new inter-American oonf1iots will arise in the future. 
Brazil and Argentina are the natural rivals on the South Amerioan 
oontinent and, aooording to at least one able commentator, are 
spoiling for the opportunity to ~t at eaoh other's throats • 
• • • • Great Argentina, with its satellite bufter states, plus n 
Peru, on the one hand, and Brazil, with its tie-up with Colombia, 
~he progress ot the law oodifioation, though slow, is 
steady. As a whole, this work is one ot the tew unmitigated 
assets of Pan Amerioan relations. 
105 
Ecuador and Chile, on the other, are two powerful divisions that 
endanger the peace of the continent and the world." 1 Ironically, 
if the war does come, it will be tought with arms now be ing sup-
plied by the United States. 
5. Despite the tact that there is cause tor believing 
the sinoerity 01' President Roosevelt in his non-intervention 
stand tor the United States, the polioy has been checkered, to 
say the least, even since the beginning of Roosevelt's administra-
2 
tion. The prime example is Cv.ba, in 1933, when this country, 
in order to a void one revolution, aided in overthrowing Machado 
and in setting up the De Caspedes puppet government which, de-
spite Mr. Sumner Welles' attempt at oonstitution writing, was 
overthrown in less than two weeks. The new government was 
trankly leftist in nature, and recognition was withheld while 
thirty American naval vessels were rushed to the scene and every 
pressure was exerted to destroy the government ot Grau San Martin. 
The United States embassy, with Mr. Welles on the scene tor a 
while, became a oenter 01' conspiracy; General Batista, with the 
support 01' the United States, was able to overthrow the Grau 
San Martin government, which was slowly but surely gainin-g 
popular strength. Batista was 1Jmn.edia tely reoognized by the 
United States. "The only conclusion must be tbat, despite the 
~eals, .2::Q.. c it., p. 347. Announcement 01' tight ing 
between Peru and~cuador was announced in the newspapers ot 
duly 7. 
2 Ct. supra, p. 23. Argentina's own peculiar conception 
01' non-intervention in the Chaco has also been noted; intra, p. 21. 
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repeal ot the Platt amendment, and the enunciation of the new 
Roosevelt policy, the old yardstick of stability by force and 
1 
intervention was utilized." 
Although strict adherence to the non-intervention policy 
in the case of the recent Mexican oil expropriation is more 
laudable than this country's action in the Cuban incident, re-
prisals of the United States, in the form of the cessation of 
silver purchases, has worked great hardships on our closest 
2 
southern neighbor. 
o. Petruchio would have had less trouble in proving 
to the entire world that the moon was made of green cheese than 
the Pan American states will have in demonstrating their cultural 
unity. The truth of the matter is that no such unity exists; 
the very fact that the delegates to the Conferences must have 
speeches transcribed into four languages before they know whether 
to applaud or to disapprove is one proof of this. Aside trom 
the major difficulty of language ditferences, the peoples ot 
the two Americas are contronted with dissimilarities ot dis-
position, ways ot doing business, historic and cultural tradi-
tions, race problems, cultural heritages, religion, and living 
standards. The surprising tact is that the Central and South 
American nations ditfer almost as much among themselves in 
lBeals, 232.- ill., p. 236. Trenchant criticism ot the 
policy ot the United States in this matter is quoted by Beals 
trom several Latin American newspapers. 
2~exico in Revolution," Fortune, XVIII, No.4 (October, 
1938), p. 114. 
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these respects as they all differ trom the United States. Nor 
can the several hundred resolutions that have been passed at the 
various meetings of the countries do a great deal to mitigate 
the situation. 
7. As inhabitants of the same detached continent, the 
people of the Americas would seem to have a natural incentive 
for mutual interests and mutual cooperation. But a stronger, 
more intense feeling of mutuality pulling in the opposite di-
rection is the sentiment of the groups which were at one time 
politically united and where to some extent this feeling for 
unity still flourishes. Thus there are groups in the countries 
of the River Plata region, the states of Central America, the 
constituents of old Great Colombia, and the members of the 
Peru-Bolivia Federation that aspire to their former unity and 
consec.uently exercise disintegrating functions in the larger 
1 
solidarity movement. 
S. The problem of the competing economies of the 
American states is an ever-present and an all-important one; 
to date, no appreciable steps have been taken in the direction 
of any per.manent solution. 
9. The biggest paradox of all in the problem of inter-
American unity is the discrepancy between the ideal of democracy 
1 Alfaro, ~. ~., p. 73. 
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and the faot of diotatorship. President Roosevelt's advooaoy 
of demooratio and oonstitutional government in the Western 
Hemisphere, if aooepted at its faoe value and not as so muoh 
diplomatic palaver, would be dangerous dootrine seriously 
threatening the peaoe of Latin America. His words are a oall 
for mass revolution in most of the twenty states south of the 
Rio Grande. Though the picture changes with the utmost rapidity 
(mostly for the worse) and exaot information is diffioult to ob-
tain, the more one studies, the more one comes to the conolusion 
that the so-oalled demooraoies of the south are, in faot, de-
l 
oidedly undemocratic. 
The southern republios have their own peculiar kind of 
diotatorship; but this does not signify that they are not oor-
rupt, overbearing, and despotic. Brazil is a good example. 
Getulio Vargas, from all aocounts, is a good-humored buffoon 
of sorts, not censoring, and even enjoying the many unoompli-
mentary j okes about himself. Most of these Jests have to do 
with Getulio's stranglehold on the presidency (nearly eleven 
years in offioe to date). Typical is the one about a newly-
minted small coin bearing Getulio's profile. The joke: "They'll 
have to invent a new and more powerful purgative, now." HWhy?" 
"Beoause when baby swallows that -- well, you know how hard it -
lMr. Beals affirms, furthermore, that the southern 
oountries are led by "one of the world's prize oollections of 
diplomatic outthroats." 
1 
is to get Getulio out!" 
This certainly would never be a llowed in Germany; but 
this does not detract trom the fact that the Brazilian consti-
tution allows the president supreme power of the state. He 
has the right to initiate laws and the authority to suspend 
the national congress and to dictate legislation by decree; he 
can intervene in state governments, suspending legislatures 
and ruling through hand-picked federal commissioners; and he 
? 
can hold office indefinitely. He makes use of all these powers 
as well as the usual coercive measures to suppress political 
opposition. This is Roosevelt's ~y friend, President Vargas." 
At least as bad as the Brazilian dictatorship are, by 
the latest count, those of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Santo Domingo, Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, 
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina. In the mild dictatorship 
group fall Venezuela and Chile while Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Uruguay, and Mexico seem to be the only Pan American strongholds 
3 
of even faint democracy. Hostilities abroad have halted the 
\i 
threat of German penetration Which had gained steadily from 1934 
until 1939, but the large group of dictatorships remains to water 
the strength of Western Hemisphere democracy. 
lFortune, XIX, No.1 (January, 1939), 32. 
!Stephen Nast, "Fascism and Communism in South America," 
Foreign Policy Reports, XIII, No. 19 (December 15, 1937), 228-9. 
3From a confidential report by John Gunther at a meeting 
of the Foreign Policy Association. Undated, mimeographed. 
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10. As a result of this penchant for despotism, which, 
by the way, is partly the result of ine:t'ficient and weak demo-
cratic forms, the Latin American states are a most fertile and 
receptive field for the Fascist economic, cultural, and political 
infiltration. The range of activities of foreign propaganda 
agencies is a truly amazing story; that such activities have 
not been thoroughly scotched is an insight into the governments, 
1 
themselves. 
11. Lack of sincerity on the part of the Latin American 
nations in supporting real continental solidarity is indicated by 
the fact that only fourteen countries have bothered to ratify 
the convention setting up the secretariat for inter-American re-
lations, the Pan American Union. The treaty establishing the 
Union to promote oooperation on "moral" rather than political 
grounds was signed in 1928; after thirteen years, the Unio11. still 
operates by resolution and not by law. 
12. That the Pan American Union works under the legal 
fiction of fostering "moral" as opposed to "political" ooopera-
tion is another indication of the organizational defect in 
inter-Amerioan relations. 
Casting the light of the first group of faotors against 
the shadow of the second reveals no encouraging pattern. It is 
IDavid Efron, WLatin America and the Fascist Holy Alliance," 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
CCIV (Jury~939), 17-25. -- ---
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obvious that dur ing the quest for inter-~..merican solidarity 
some obstacles have been overcome; but many have been circum-
vented, many others ignored. 
During the last decade, many impediments to harmonious 
relations have been removed. Intervention has been abandoned, 
at least as an avowed policy, by the United States, and this 
country's military might has been withdrawn trom all Latin 
American countries. The United States has reversed its former 
policy with regard to recognition and has led the movement in 
the establishment of peace machinery for the hemisphere. The 
Monroe Doctrine has been continentalized; "dollar diplomacy" 
and "paternalism" have given away to the "Good Neighbor." 
In sum, much has been done to promote mutual good will and to 
remove traditional causes ot distrust. 
Good will and mutual trust, however, are nothing but 
prerequisites for the attainment ot a real degree of economic 
and political unity tor the nations and peoples ot the Western 
Hemisphere. The question is whether the springboard ot ac-
complishments-to-date is strong enough to carry the nations ot 
the hemisphere over the political, economic, and cultural morass 
that must be hurdled it Pan American solidarity is to became a 
permanent reality and not to remain a verbal will-o'-the-wisp. 
CHAPTER VIII 
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Many proposals for further strengthening inter-American 
solidarity have been made; most of these have been directed at 
creating an actual League of American States. The basic idea 
of real union was, in fact, germinated by the very first con-
ference of Central American states convened by Bolivar in 1826. 
Woodrow Wilson was probably the modern progenitor of the idea, 
first disclosing it in a speech and later broaching it in a 
circular telegram to the Latin American nations in the winter 
of 1916. The war intervened, and the political union was next 
brought forward by Dr. Baltasar Brum, President of Uruguay, in 
I 
1~20; President Brum published a draft of his plan which he 
hoped would be considered at the Fifth Conference of American 
States at Santiago in 1923. This consideration, however, did 
not take place. 
A meeting held in Panama in 1926 to celebrate the cen-
tenary of the first Congress passed a resolution recommending 
the oonsideration of political union at the Sixth Conference; 
the Havana conclave, however, did not even have the topic on 
the agenda. Salvador was rumored to be preparing a plan for 
the Montevideo Conference, but again the topic was not found 
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on the program. Both Colombia and the Dominioan Republio had 
drafts presented at Buenos Aires in 1936, however; these,it 
has been noted, were referred to the next Conferenoe although 
six or seven states showed a disposition to disouss the matter 
favorably. Sinoe then, oonsideration of the politioal union 
1 
idea has been postponed from meeting to meeting. 
It is signifioant that most of the measures that have 
been considered for strengthening the solidarity of the Amerioan 
states plaoe their emphasis on- improving formal struoture. One 
aspeot of this is the preoooupation with peaoe plans; another 
is the emphasis plaoed on formal ratifioation of t~ties. And 
this gives rise to a fundamental oritioism of the attempt to 
establish inter-Amerioan solidarity. 
The point is this: all the maohinery for peaoe that oan 
be oonoocted, all the ratifioations of peaoe paots that oan be 
seoured, all the paraphernalia of organization that can be set 
up will not be suffioient either to establish solidarity or to 
insure peace. A peaoe plan is only as good as the intent of its 
members; there oan be no peaoe unless the will for peaoe is 
present and the national polioies of states follow pacifio ohan-
nels. If ever an historical lesson were olear, it is the one 
that the disintegration of the League of Nations has taught. 
Causes for the breakdown of the European system of co lleotive 
aotion are to be found neither in the disutility of League 
lA complete disoussion of the idea of a League of 
Amerioan States is in Alfaro, ~. oit., pp. 74-90. 
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maohinery nor in the non-existence ot League torce; that 
breakdown was caused by the sabotage ot the League ideal 
through the disinolination ot its members to deal directly, 
simply, and torthrightly with problems ot territory, armaments, 
economic imperialism, and nationalistic jingo. 
The sad tact is that America seems to be repeating 
Europe's grievous error. There can be no denial ot the proposi-
tion that an actual political union ot Amerioan states is a de-
sired eventuality. But no suoh union can hope to achieve suc-
cess in establishing permanent peaoe until its constituent 
members have tirst achieved a mutual basis ot actio.. The 
evidence indicates that this basis does not now exist in the 
Americas; nor will the superimposition ot any new machinery 
on that already existing provide, ipso taoto, the essential 
mutuality. This mutuality can only be achieved through the 
removal ot the basic causes tor dissent. Organization may aid 
in the removal, but, in any case, the tirst step is honest in-
tent and a willingness on the part ot American nations to sub-
merge national interests to the inter-American good. 
In the Americas, no less than 1m Europe, the problem 
is complicated by divergent cultures, language, and economies. 
In America, unlike Europe, it is tair to say that the entire 
success ot the plan depends upon the actions ot one nation, the 
United states. It is possible that the polioy ot other American 
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states, Argentina, for example, could make eventual inter-
American solidarity a difficult aocomplishment; without realis-
tic action from the United States, however, real solidarity is 
entirely impossible. 
Since 1932, the strengthening of Pan American solidarity 
has been advocated and furthered by the United States as one as-
pect of its foreign policy. Other countries of the hemisphere, 
notably those of the Caribbean region, have stood solidly behind 
the United States in this policy. If still others, notably the 
Argentine bloc, have seemed non-cooperative, and even obstructive, 
it is because Pan Americanism is no unmixed blessing. 
One of the primary purposes of the movement is the achieve-
ment of peace on this continent; it is strikingly obvious, how-
ever, that if the Pan American nations allow themselves to be 
aligned in the close political cooperation that this country's 
State Department now advocates, they may very well find them-
selves embroiled in an unwanted war on another continent. 
At the same t!me, even within the hemisphere, the South 
American states cannot be censured for viewing with alarm the 
dangerous inconsistencies of the foreign and economic policies 
of the United States. The lack of foresight on the part of the 
leaders of this country is astounding to contemplate. The 
strong advocacy of a cartel plan for marketing surpluses and 
its sudden dropping is a good example in the economic sphere; 
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nor have the final results of our eoonomio planning been viewed 
with any universal approval. Following the Havana Conferenoe, 
Dr. Leopoldo Melo, head of the Argentine delegation, was forth-
right in saying that the United States· proposals for the ab-
sorption of surpluses were superfioial and of fleeting benefit; 
the Conferenoe failed, he asserted, to bring forward any far-
1 
reaching general plan for oontinuous eoonomio oollaboration. 
Though this attitude may be viewed a s an expression of truou-
lenoe from Amerioa· s chief rival for leadership in inter-
.Amerioan affairs, the very faot that Argentina is in this 
position gives the United States greater reason to bring her 
into the 1'0 ld. 
Political see-sawing by the United States is oause for 
even greater justifiable alarm. Consider the fact, for example, 
that in Ig39, at Panama, the advocacy of the United States was 
responsible for a General Declaration of Neutrality whioh pro-
vided, among other things, against "the fitting out, arming, or 
augmenting • • • • the forces or armament of any ship or vessel 
to be employed in the servioe of one of the belligerents." 
Consider the further faot that a little more than a year later, 
the President of the United States made uee of powers given him. 
by Congress to do precisely these things the oountry had pledged 
itself to prevent! 
INew York Times, July 31, 1940, p. 4. --..;;..;:;::;;;;;.;;.,;;;. 
117 
If solidarity were complete, the foreign polioy of 
the United States would be bringing the entire hemisphere 
instead of just this country olose to outright belligerency 
in the European war. But the Pan Amerioan countries, like the 
United States, pledged themselves to neutrality; unlike the 
United States, many of these countries have seen no reason, 
oonsistent with their own national self-interest, to alter 
that pledge. This is an extraordinarily strong ind;ioation of 
a fundamental d isuni ty in 'the policies of the states of the two 
Americas. This disunity was concretely demonstrated when, in 
April, 1941, the United States seized Ger.man, Italian, and 
Danish ships within her ports. The newspapers of the United 
States gave great space to the action of the Central American 
nations and of Per~ in following this country's action with 
similar seizures. But the significant and disappointing fact 
was that neither Colombia nor Brazil nor Chile nor Argentina 
1 
backed the United States with like action. 
Only one conclusion oan be drawn. Towards the Americas, 
the United States pursues a policy of solidarity; towards 
Europe and its war, the United States takes definite sides and 
fast approaches a state of outright belligerency. The two 
policies are inconsistent and antagonistic, and the result is 
a dilemma of the most acute variety. Insofar as we pursue one 
policy, we inevitably weaken the other. 
lpan-American News, Bi-weekly Information Service 
(Washington: ForeIgn Fc)lIcy Association, April 10, 1941) , 
II, No.5, 1. 
118 
Further evidence of disunity in the Americas, caused 
by action of the United States in her program of defense, was 
revealed by the destroyer trade for naval bases with Great 
Britain. The southern co~tries viewed this action with alarm. 
Said a Colombia paper, spokesman of the Conservative party: 
At Havana an agreement was solemnly reached to put any 
transferred European possession under Pan American trustee-
ship. We do not doubt the need of the United States for 
certain additional bases, but the present Roosevelt program 
ot utilizing the dire straits of the collapsing British 
Empire to seize suoh bases without consulting the rest ot 
the oontinent • • • • is neither demooratio nor honest • • • • 
We talked at Havana at joint continental defense. Instead, 
Roosevelt rushed to Canada to make an alliance, with danger-
ous war implioations, quite apart fram the rest ot the two 
continents • • • • How long is Latin America going to con-
tinue to take stook in hypocritical and talse-front Pan-
Amerioan oonferences?" 
And another Central American organ, oommenting on the 
same matter, concluded: ~aziism is a remote and passing menace. 
Yankeeism is an immediate and permanent menaoe, now and for all 
1 
time." Though Seoretary Hull, perhaps stung by the storm of 
criticism, hastened to announce that the new bases would be put 
at the disposition of the Latin American states, the implications 
of our European policy are negating the good will created by the 
administration before the war. This reaction of the Pan American 
states is altogether natural. The times very strongly hint that 
the United States is indulging in new imperialistic ventures and 
oalling them, this time, ~asures of defense." 
lCarleton Beals, ~-Amerioa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1940), p. 441. 
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The solution does not lie in putting a stop to defensive 
measures tor the hemisphere. Rather the southern countries must 
be taken into tull partnership tor the protection ot the two con-
tinents. That there is no single agency coordinating or consoli-
dating the military and strategic planning ot the twenty-one 
nations demonstrates that not even the first adequate step has 
been taken toward this c ammon-sense goal. 
Yet even this cooperation, in the tinal analysis, would 
not materially add to the permanent achievement ot Pan American 
solidarity. An interesting concomitant ot the dilemma taced 
by the United States due to its contlicting toreign policies 
in Europe and in America is the program ot combating dictator-
ships across the Atlantic while cooperating wi th them. below 
the Rio Grande. Recent history, especially, seems clearly to 
point out that collaboration with personal rulers is an unhealthy 
marriage ot convenience. Consequently, appeasement in the 
European phase ot this country's toreign policy is viewed with 
scorn as an unrealistic course; yet in the Americas, United 
States policy is precisely one ot appeasement. There is no 
reason to believe that the American brand ot dictatorship will 
not run true to torm, and that the American dictators will not 
utilize cooperation ot the United States only to the extent that 
it turthers their own rule-by-force and their own personal am-
bition. 
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From this observation follows the first of two 
fundamental policies for the United States on whioh genuine 
and lasting inter-American solidarity must be based: a deeper 
regard must be shown for the people of Central and South America 
rather than for their unrepresentative, tyrannical governments. 
This regard might be shown, for example, by the United States 
demonstrating an interest in the welfare of liberal movements 
within the states, or by the United States engaging in a posi-
tive effort to raise the living standard of all the peoples 
of these regions. The problem is a ticklish one; but in the 
end, .1t will be impossible to defend Latin Amerioa against 
totalitarian influences unless the people of Latin America are 
allowed to share equally in the larger freedom that the United 
States seeks to preserve. 
Concomitant with this stand is the second foundation 
stone for realistio aotion in the attainment of solidarity; 
the oonception that trade is c onduoted solely for profit must 
be abandoned, and the United States must adopt a criterion ot 
trade aimed a.t meeting the needs ot the people ot the Central 
and South American oountries. Under the present policy, the 
Southern Americas have only the choioe ot becoming economic 
dependents of either Europe or the United States; there is no 
cause tor their showing preference tor the latter dependency. 
Measures that wUl round out and strengthen the internal 
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eoonomies of the Pan Amerioan states, that will raise the 
living standard of their peoples, that will deal with the 
surplus oommodity problem on a mutually advantageous basis, 
that will increase the flow of goods between the Americas 
only these measures sponsored by the Unit ed states will 
achieve the solidarity ideal. The results, too, might do 
more than anything else for the cause of political democracy. 
In the short view of things, suoh a policy will result in an 
economic loss to the United States; but long-ter.m results will 
be a thousand times worth the investment. 
Success of inter-American solidarity depends upon the 
extent to which the United States pursues this twofold policy. 
The importanoe of stronger, formal political ties, of oontinued 
cultural and intellectual oooperation, of peace pacts, and of 
juridioal action cannot be doubted; these matters, however, pale 
to relative insignifioance in a view of the total situation. 
There is no cause for optimisn over the eventual outcome. 
The ourrent predominant interest of the leaders of the United 
States in the affairs of Europe has led them to relegate the 
affairs of Amerioa to a minor ring in the big show, and has 
kept them from making effective and adequate use of the oppor-
tunities created by those same European affairs. As late as 
May 26, 1941, President Roosevelt epitomized the verbal atti-
tude of this oountry's statesmen by saying: "Now, as never 
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before, the unity of the American republics is of supreme 
importance to each and every one of us and to the cause of 
freedom throughout the world. Our tuture independence is bound 
1 
up with the future independence of all of our sister republics." 
The words are true, but 'Nords are easy; deeds are needed, 
but deeds are difficult. 
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